An Extensible Approach to Session Polymorphism‡

Matthew Goto¹, Radha Jagadeesan¹, Alan Jeffrey², Corin Pitcher¹, and James Riely¹

¹School of Computing, DePaul University and ²Alcatel-Lucent Bell Labs

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Session types describe and constrain the input/output behavior of systems. Existing session typing systems have limited support for polymorphism. For example, existing systems cannot provide the most general type for a generic proxy process that forwards messages between two channels. We provide a polymorphic session typing system for the π calculus, and demonstrate the utility of session-type-level functions in combination with polymorphic session typing. The type system guarantees subject reduction and safety properties, but not deadlock freedom. We describe a formalization of the type system in Coq. The proofs of subject reduction and safety properties, as well as typing of example processes, have been mechanically verified.

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1. Introduction

Session types for communication-centered programming (Takeuchi et al., 1994; Honda et al., 1998) specify the interaction between the sender and receiver on a communication channel within the channel’s type. For example, in the syntax of (Gay and Hole, 2005) the session type \(?\text{int}.\text{int}.!\text{int}.\text{end}\) describes a channel endpoint upon which two integers are received and an integer is subsequently transmitted. Modeling more complex protocols makes use of branching and recursion in session types. Session type systems were originally developed for process calculi, but have been adapted to functional (Vasconcelos et al., 2006) and object-oriented (Coppo et al., 2007; Gay et al., 2010) programming languages. There are implementations of session typing—providing static typechecking of I/O—for languages such as Haskell (Neubauer and Thiemann, 2004a; Sackman and Eisenbach, 2008; Pucella and Tov, 2008; Kiselyov et al., 2010) and Java (Hu et al., 2008).

However, current approaches to session types provide inadequate support for session polymorphism and extensibility via user-defined session-type functions. Consequently, a software component with generic I/O behavior may have to be typechecked once for each communication protocol with which it is used. In this paper, we define a type system that supports polymorphism over session types. This is the first session type system that can assign a useful polymorphic session type to a generic buffer process that forwards messages from one channel to another. Building on ideas from dependent type theory, we integrate functions over session types into the type system. Our type system guarantees that the type of a message occurring in an output is permitted by the typing of the process. The type system, examples, and proofs of subject reduction and safety properties have been formalized in Coq. The Coq definitions and proofs are available online (Goto et al., 2011).

In the remainder of this section, we provide an overview of the current support for polymorphism in session typing systems, its limitations, and outline our solution.

1.1. Session Polymorphism

Consider a recursively-defined \texttt{sink} process that repeatedly reads and discards messages from a channel parameter \texttt{lft}:

\begin{verbatim}
proc sink(lft) = lft?x . sink(lft)
\end{verbatim}

We model session types as labelled transition systems, where states are session types and labelled transitions represent input and output events, following the semantic subtyping approach...
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(Castagna et al., 2009). Then, intuitively, the \textit{lft} parameter in the \textit{sink} process above should have a session type \textit{sink} that permits a self transition upon input of a value of the top type \textit{Top}, written as:

\[
\text{sink} \xrightarrow{\text{?}\text{Top}} \text{sink}
\]

A channel with session type \textit{sink} may be read to yield a value of type \textit{Top}, and the channel will have type \textit{sink} in the continuation. (In the syntax of (Gay and Hole, 2005), \textit{sink} would be recursively defined as \textit{sink} = \mu X.\text{?}\text{Top}.X.)

Session subtyping (Gay and Hole, 2005; Castagna et al., 2009) allows \textit{sink} to accept channels with session types that are subtypes of \textit{sink}. However, session subtyping can yield types that are too weak. For example, in the following \textit{echo} process, each message received on a channel \textit{lft} is echoed back on the same channel.

\[
\text{proc\ echo(lft)} = \text{lft}\text{?}x.\text{lft}\text{!}x.\text{echo(lft)}
\]

Since \textit{x} is given the type \textit{Top}, the \textit{echo} process should permit subtypes of the session type \textit{echo}\textsubscript{Top} satisfying:

\[
\text{echo}\textsubscript{Top} \xrightarrow{\text{?}\text{Top}\text{!}\text{Top}} \text{echo}\textsubscript{Top}
\]

where we write \(s_0 \xrightarrow{m_0} s_1 \xrightarrow{m_1} \ldots \xrightarrow{m_n} s_{n+1}\) for a sequence of transitions when the intermediate session types are uninteresting.

Unfortunately, the session type \textit{echo}\textsubscript{int} satisfying

\[
\text{echo}\textsubscript{int} \xrightarrow{\text{?}\text{int}\text{!}\text{int}} \text{echo}\textsubscript{int}
\]

is weaker because responses are only constrained to be a subtype of \textit{Top} instead of \textit{int}.

In seeking expressiveness beyond that provided by session subtyping, (Dezani-Ciancaglini et al., 2007b; Gay, 2008) investigate bounded polymorphism in the context of session types. Bounded polymorphism allows the \textit{echo} process to be used with subtypes of a session type \textit{echo}\textsubscript{\forall} satisfying:

\[
\forall a <: \text{Top}, (\text{echo}\textsubscript{\forall} \xrightarrow{\text{?}\text{a}\text{!}\text{a}} \text{echo}\textsubscript{\forall})
\]

That is, a process reads from a channel with session type \textit{echo}\textsubscript{\forall} yielding a value of some type parameter \textit{a}, a subtype of \textit{Top}, and then sends a value of type \textit{a} back on the same channel.

However, common generic processes cannot be typed adequately with bounded polymorphism. Consider the unidirectional forwarder process that copies messages from channel \textit{lft} to channel \textit{rht}:

\[
\text{proc\ fwd(lft, rht)} = \text{lft}\text{?}x.\text{rht}\text{!}x.\text{fwd(lft, rht)}
\]

For any session type \textit{s}, it should be possible to use the \textit{fwd} process with channel \textit{lft} assigned session type \textit{s} and \textit{rht} assigned session type (\textit{dual} \textit{s}), where the \textit{dual} operation replaces inputs with outputs and vice versa. The forwarder process will not produce incorrect output on \textit{rht}, as long as it receives correct input on \textit{lft}. We refer to this different form of polymorphism as \textit{session polymorphism}. 
To enable session polymorphism we allow processes to read on channels with abstract session types and incorporate deductive reasoning principles about session types into the type system. In contrast, bounded polymorphism (Dezani-Ciancaglini et al., 2007b; Gay, 2008) prevents reads on channels with abstract session types, precluding the typing of \texttt{fwd}.

A call to the \texttt{fwd} process generates a single use channel upon which to pass the parameters \texttt{lft} and \texttt{rht}. This single use channel is given the polymorphic session type \texttt{fwd} satisfying:

\[
\forall s, \ (\texttt{fwd} \leftarrow \texttt{Ch(s)} \Rightarrow \texttt{Ch(dual(s))} \rightarrowend)
\]

This specification of the session type \texttt{fwd} states that a channel with session type \texttt{fwd} may be used to read two channels with session types \texttt{s} and \texttt{(dual s)} respectively. For example, if a channel \texttt{n} has type \texttt{Ch(fwd)}, then we expect that \texttt{lft} and \texttt{rht} have dual session types at the point where they are read in a one-step forwarding process:

\[
n\leftarrow \texttt{lft}, n\leftarrow \texttt{rht}, \texttt{lft}\leftarrow x, \texttt{rht}! x
\]

Then the key to our type system is that the \texttt{fwd} process may read upon the channel \texttt{lft} with session type \texttt{s}, and we deduce that \texttt{s} permits reading a value of some type \texttt{a}. Moreover, we can deduce that \texttt{(dual s)} permits writing a value of type \texttt{a}, thus justifying typing of the \texttt{fwd} process.

\subsection{Session Transducers}

Polymorphism allows code to place requirements on some of the structure of a session type and be parametric in the remainder. For example, consider the translation process below that forwards tokens from \texttt{lft} to \texttt{rht}, but substitutes a \texttt{COLOR} token for each \texttt{COLOUR} token. We seek a polymorphic session typing for the \texttt{translate} process where the session type for \texttt{rht} is described in terms of the session type for \texttt{lft}.

\[
\textproc{translate}(\texttt{lft, rht}) =
\begin{array}{l}
\texttt{lft}\leftarrow x, (\{x=\texttt{COLOUR}\} \texttt{rht}! \texttt{COLOR}, \texttt{translate}(\texttt{lft, rht}) \\
+ \{x\neq \texttt{COLOUR}\} \texttt{rht}! x, \texttt{translate}(\texttt{lft, rht}))
\end{array}
\]

We take inspiration from dependent type theory and recent implementations of type-level functions (Kiselyov et al., 2010; Jeffrey and Rathke, 2011) by adopting type-level functions that act upon session types, referred to as session-type functions in the sequel. An open-world assumption applies to session types, and we allow users to define new session-type functions. Session-type functions are specified in terms of the input and output transitions of their session type parameters.

To illustrate in the context of the \texttt{translate} process, we define a unary session-type function \texttt{translate} : \texttt{session} \Rightarrow \texttt{session} acting as a \texttt{transducer} on session types using the following inference rules:

\[
\forall s s', (s \leftarrow \texttt{translate(s))} \\
\forall s k s', k \neq \texttt{COLOUR} \Rightarrow (s \leftarrow \texttt{translate(s))}
\]

The first inference rule states that if the underlying session type \texttt{s} allows an input of singleton type \{\texttt{COLOUR}\} — in which case the value received must be the token \texttt{COLOUR} — then \texttt{translate(s)} allows an input of singleton type \{\texttt{COLOR}\}. The second inference rule states that any other token
that can be input on \( s \) can be input on \( \text{translate}(s) \). It is implicit that these are the only rules defining the behavior of \( \text{translate} \), and we make use of the associated inversion rule to type processes.

1.3. Deduction

In prior session type systems, the typing rule for an input command \( \text{lnf}?x.P \) requires the channel \( \text{lnf} \) to be assigned a session type \( S \) such that an input transition \( S \xrightarrow{A} T \) follows from the semantics of \( S \). As suggested in the \( \text{fwd} \) example above, the key to our solution is a relaxation of input typing: any session type associated with \( \text{lnf} \) permits input, including session types with free session-type variables. For example, in typechecking \( \text{lnf}?x.P \), the continuation process \( P \) is typed in a context extended with an input transition hypothesis \( S \xrightarrow{a} t \), for a fresh type variable \( a \) and a fresh session-type variable \( t \). Runtime violations of the protocols specified by session types are prevented by the standard session-typing discipline for output commands.

Transition hypotheses serve two roles in typing. Firstly, they may be used directly to justify the typing of an output command. Secondly, they may be used in the deduction of (in)equations and other transition hypotheses. For example, from \( \text{translate}(S) \xrightarrow{A} T \) and the equation \( A = \{\text{COLOR}\} \), we deduce that there exists a session type \( T' \) such that \( S \xrightarrow{T'(\text{COLOR})} T' \) and \( T = \text{translate}(T') \). This deduction arising from input transitions can be seen as type refinement (Freeman and Pfenning, 1991; Gordon and Fournet, 2010) arising from input commands.

1.4. Formalization

We formalize our polymorphic session-type system for the \( \pi \) calculus within Coq. The permissible deductions about transitions are given a shallow embedding in Coq for readability and convenience in our mechanized proofs. Other logical systems with support for inductive families of data types (Coquand and Paulin-Mohring, 1990; Dybjer, 1991; Coquand, 1992) could be substituted in place of Coq.

Session typing requires a linear type system, and consequently we use a deep embedding of the process typing judgement within Coq. We represent \( \pi \) calculus processes using first-order abstract syntax. (See (Röckl and Hirschhoff, 2003) for an analysis of deep vs. shallow embeddings and first-order vs. higher-order abstract syntax in the context of the \( \pi \) calculus.) To facilitate reasoning with first-order syntax we adopt a locally-nameless representation of \( \pi \) variables and names, following the well-established use of locally-nameless representation in \( \lambda \) calculi (Aydemir et al., 2008; Charguéraud, 2011).

The Coq formalization has been used to establish subject reduction, and, hence, freedom from runtime errors and communication error, where communication protocols for channels are specified via their session types. The proofs of these safety results do not include additional axioms.

The type system presented here sacrifices deadlock freedom (or progress) guarantees. Whether this trade off between deadlock freedom guarantees and session polymorphism is necessary is left to future work (we discuss this point further in Section 6).

Nevertheless, we argue that safety results are particularly useful in a polymorphic setting via a series of examples. These examples culminate in Example 13 where we validate the theory by showing that an implementation of the alternating-bit protocol (ABP) admits a polymorphic
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session typing. The ABP provides error correction over lossy channels, and is thus a surprising candidate for a non-degenerate session typing. Session-type functions are used to express the invariants of internal lossy channels in relationship to external channels, including a static indication of which messages have been successfully delivered. However, the external interface to the ABP has a straightforward typing that, in essence, indicates that the ABP acts as the identity on channels carrying tokens. The following Coq statement gives the process typing judgement \( |-p \) for the ABP process \( \text{abp} \) with external channels \( \text{lft} \) and \( \text{rht} \) that are assigned session types \( \text{SToks s} \) and \( \text{SDual (SToks s)} \) respectively:

\[
\text{abp} \quad \text{typing} : \quad \text{forall s : session,}
\]

\[
\text{CTX.add (Nm (Free "lft"), TChannel (SToks s))}
\]

\[
\quad \text{(CTX.add (Nm (Free "rht"), TChannel (SDual (SToks s)))})
\]

\[
\quad \text{CTX.empty) \quad |-p \ abp \ (Nm (Free "lft")) \ (Nm (Free "rht"))}
\]

In this statement, \( \text{abp\_typing} \) is the name of a constructive proof of a proposition about process typing. The proof uses the type system defined in this paper. The process typed is \( \text{abp} \ (Nm \ (\text{Free "lft"})) \ (Nm \ (\text{Free "rht"})) \), where \( \text{abp} \) is a Coq function that returns a representation of the \( \pi \) process for the ABP when given two values (names in this case) to use as the external channels. The typing occurs in a process context that adds types for the values to the empty context. The session types in the channel types assigned to the names refer to a universally quantified session variable \( s \). Thus the proof of \( \text{abp\_typing} \) can be instantiated at any session type.

1.5. Organization

In Sections 2 and 3, we present our process language and polymorphic session type system. We demonstrate the type system in a series of detailed examples in Section 4. The final example shows that our typing system is powerful enough to show partial correctness of the alternating bit protocol, demonstrating the use of polymorphic session typing with lossy channels. Section 5 presents our subject reduction and safety results. Section 6 describes related work. We conclude in Section 7 with a summary of our contributions and directions for future work.

2. Operational Model

In this section we describe the process language and its operational semantics.

2.1. Process Language

The process language is a synchronous \( \pi \) calculus (Milner et al., 1992) with matching and mis-matching tests. (Mis)matching tests compare not channels but a distinguished set of values that we refer to as tokens. Tokens may be compared and transmitted, but cannot be generated by \( \nu \).

We use tokens to represent primitive data, and as labels for an encoding of the standard label selection and branching for session types (Takeuchi et al., 1994; Honda et al., 1998).

The original \( \pi \) calculus does not distinguish the endpoints of a channel by polarities, and nor does the session type system described in (Honda et al., 1998). We follow (Gay and Hole, 2005) in using polarized channel names in conjunction with session typing. That is, we distinguish the
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\[
\begin{align*}
    u, v & \vdash n & \text{(Channel name value)} \\
    \pi & \vdash \pi & \text{(Channel coname value)} \\
    k & \vdash k & \text{(Token value)} \\
    x & \vdash x & \text{(Variable value)} \\
    P, Q, R & \vdash 0 & \text{(Zero process)} \\
    u!v.P & \vdash u!v.P & \text{(Output process)} \\
    u?x.P & \vdash u?x.P & \text{(Input process)} \\
    [u=v].P & \vdash [u=v].P & \text{(Match process)} \\
    [u\neq v].P & \vdash [u\neq v].P & \text{(Mismatch process)} \\
    (\nu n).P & \vdash (\nu n).P & \text{(New name process)} \\
    P+Q & \vdash P+Q & \text{(Choice process)} \\
    P|Q & \vdash P|Q & \text{(Parallel process)} \\
    *P & \vdash *P & \text{(Replication process)}
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 1: Values and Processes

name \( n \) from the coname \( \pi \), representing the two sides of a channel. Conames are not themselves names, but are a derived set. Both names and conames are values, which may be communicated independently; thus, the \( \nu n \) operator creates one name, but two values. The distinction between the name and coname is arbitrary but must be maintained consistently throughout an execution.

Formally, we distinguish three disjoint sets of identifiers: names, \( n \); tokens, \( k \); and variables, \( x, y \). We use the term \textit{channel} to include both names and conames. Channels, tokens and variables are values. Values and processes are defined in Figure 1.

In examples, we sometimes drop final occurrences of \( 0 \). The variable \( x \) is bound by input \((u?x.P)\) with scope \( P \). The name \( n \) and coname \( \pi \) are bound by restriction in \((\nu n).P\) with scope \( P \). There are no binders for tokens. We identify syntax up to renaming of bound variables and names and write \( P\{u/x\} \) for the capture-free substitution of \( u \) for \( x \) in \( P \). Let \( \text{fv}(P) \) denote the set of free variables in a process, \( \text{fn}(P) \) the set of free names, and \( \text{fval}(P) \) the set of values. For example, \( \text{fval}(\nu n'.n?x.\pi!n'.\pi'n.0) = \{n, n', x\} \).

Processes are identified up to the structural equivalence, written \( P \equiv Q \), as defined in Figure 2.

2.2. Reduction Semantics

The standard reduction semantics (Milner, 1991) for \( \pi \) describes the effects of interaction but not the interaction itself. Following (Gay and Hole, 2005), we annotate the reduction relation with observations about values communicated on channels that are not hidden, in order to reason about interactions and session types. These observations are referenced in the statement of subject reduction (Theorem 5) and conformance (Theorem 7).

The sets of observable values and observations are defined in Figure 3. The observable values represent communicated values. An observable value is either a token \( k \), or * which represents any channel name or coname. Thus, the observations can be used to distinguish processes that communicate different tokens, but cannot be used to observe the identity of communicated channels. This is natural in the context of session typing, because session types describe the I/O capabilities of channels rather than their identity.
\[ P \equiv P \quad Q \equiv P \quad P \equiv Q \quad Q \equiv R \]
\[ *P \equiv *P \]
\[ P \equiv Q \quad Q \equiv P \quad P \equiv R \]
\[ n \notin fn(Q) \]
\[ (\nu n)P + Q \equiv (\nu n)(P + Q) \]
\[ ((\nu n)P) + Q \equiv (\nu n)(P + Q) \]
\[ P|0 \equiv P \quad P|Q \equiv P|Q \quad P|Q \equiv R \]
\[ n \notin fn(P) \]
\[ (\nu n)0 \equiv 0 \quad (\nu n)P \equiv P \quad (\nu n)(\nu n')P \equiv (\nu n')(\nu n)P \]
\[ P \equiv P' \quad P \equiv P' \quad P \equiv P' \]
\[ P + Q \equiv P' + Q \quad P|Q \equiv P'|Q \quad (\nu n)P \equiv (\nu n)P' \]

Fig. 2: Structural Equivalence for Processes

\[ \gamma ::= k \quad \text{(Token observable value)} \]
\[ |* \quad \text{(Hidden channel observable value)} \]
\[ \alpha ::= n?\gamma \quad \text{(Input observation)} \]
\[ |n!\gamma \quad \text{(Output observation)} \]
\[ |\tau \quad \text{(Silent observation)} \]

Fig. 3: Observable Values and Observations

In the definition of the reduction relation below, the identity of channels is hidden using the function \( \text{obsv} \), which maps a non-variable value to an observable value. It is defined by \( \text{obsv}(k) = k \) for any token, and otherwise \( \text{obsv}(u) = * \).

Observations represent: (1) an input of observable value \( \gamma \) on channel \( n \), written \( n?\gamma \); (2) an output of observable value \( \gamma \) on visible channel \( n \), written \( n!\gamma \); or (3) a hidden operation, such as interaction on a hidden channel, written \( \tau \). The operation \( (\alpha \setminus n) \) hides the (channel) name \( n \) in observation \( \alpha \).

\[ (\alpha \setminus n) = \begin{cases} \tau & \text{if } \alpha = n?\gamma \text{ or } \alpha = n!\gamma \\ \alpha & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \]

Finally, the annotated reduction relation \( P \xrightarrow{\alpha} P' \) captures reduction from a process \( P \) to \( P' \), yielding observation \( \alpha \). It is defined in Figure 4.

The annotated reduction rules for structural equivalence and parallel composition are straightforward. Matching and mismatching tests compare tokens, but not variables or (co)names. Later, runtime safety ensures that only tokens are compared in well-typed processes with no free variables.

Communication between name \( n \) and coname \( \pi \) results in an observable annotation for \( n \). For example, consider the annotated reduction sequence:

\[ (n!k.n?y.0) | (\pi x.\pi n'.0) \xrightarrow{n!k} (n?y.0) | (\pi n'.0) \xrightarrow{n?x} 0 \]
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\[
\frac{(n! u . P_1) + P_2) | ((\overline{n?} x . Q_1) + Q_2)}{n! \text{obs}(u) P_1 | Q_1 \{u/\}}}
\]

\[
\frac{((\overline{n!} u . P_1) + P_2) | ((n? x . Q_1) + Q_2)}{n! \text{obs}(u) P_1 | Q_1 \{u/\}}}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
P & \equiv Q & Q \overset{\alpha}{\rightarrow} Q' & Q' \equiv P' & P \overset{\alpha}{\rightarrow} P' & (\nu n) P \overset{\alpha}{\rightarrow} (\nu n) P' \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\frac{k \neq \ell}{[k = k] P \overset{\ell}{\rightarrow} P}
\]

\[
\frac{[k \neq \ell]}{[k \neq \ell] P \overset{\ell}{\rightarrow} P}
\]

Fig. 4: Reduction Relation

The session type system in Section 3 requires that \(n\) be assigned a session type permitting an output of token \(k\), followed by an input of a channel.

Annotated reduction is notationally similar to reduction in a labelled transition system (LTS), but it is semantically unrelated. Our non-\(\tau\) annotations indicate completed interactions, rather than potential ones as in an LTS. Our \(\tau\) annotations indicate hidden interactions, rather than completed ones as in an LTS.

2.3. Label Selection and Branching

Our choice of process language differs from earlier work by the omission of branching and choice based on labels. This omission is motivated by additional expressive power arising from the introduction of (in)equational constraints in the type system; and the desire for a minimal core language. Our process language is sufficiently expressive to encode branching and choice constructs via ordinary communication and matching/mismatching tests.

Recall the selection \(u \ll l . P\) and branching \(u \triangleright \{l_1 : P_1 \parallel l_2 : P_2 \parallel \cdots \parallel l_n : P_n\}\) constructs from (Honda et al., 1998). The expected reductions for selection and branching with polarized channels are given by (we omit the reduction when \(n\) and \(\pi\) are swapped):

\[
(n \ll l, P) | (\overline{\pi} \triangleright \{l_1 : P_1 \parallel l_2 : P_2 \parallel \cdots \parallel l_n : P_n\}) \rightarrow P \parallel P_i
\]

We now define an encoding of selection and branching constructs in our process language. In Section 3 we provide derived typing rules for these encodings. We restrict attention to binary selection and branching for brevity. First, assume that the set of labels used for selection and branching is a subset of the set of tokens. We let \(l\) range over tokens used as labels. The selection construct \(u \ll l . P\) is encoded as an output:

\[
u \ll l . P \overset{\dagger}{=} u! l . P
\]

The encoding for branching \(u \triangleright \{l_1 : P_1 \parallel l_2 : P_2\}\) inputs a label (token) on \(u\), and then uses choice to ensure that at most one of the branches \(P_1, P_2\) is executed—this is necessary to support the expected derived typing rules for branching. Intuitively, we would like the following
encoding.

\[ u \triangleright \{ l_1 : P_1 \parallel l_2 : P_2 \} = u ? x . (\lambda x = l_1 . P_1 + \lambda x = l_2 . P_2) \]

However, our semantics only reduces interactions that sit immediately inside a choice. We could modify the semantics so that (mis)matching is treated using structural equivalence rather than reduction. Here, instead, we leave reduction alone and present a slightly more complex encoding for branching.

The encoding signals the components of the choice process from matching processes that examine the label. We assume a token \( * \) for such signaling. Then we encode branching as follows (where the variable \( y \) and names \( n_1, n_2 \) for signaling channels are fresh for \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \)):

\[ u \triangleright \{ l_1 : P_1 \parallel l_2 : P_2 \} \triangleright u ? x . (\nu n_1) (\nu n_2) (\lambda \alpha) \begin{cases} x = l_1 . n_1 * \\ x = l_2 . n_2 * \\ x \neq l_1 [x \neq l_2] error * \\ ((\nu n_1 ? y . [x = l_1] P_1) + (\nu n_2 ? y . [x = l_2] P_2)) \end{cases} \]

The name \textit{error} is used to indicate when the input label matches neither \( l_1 \) nor \( l_2 \). We discuss this further below. The presence of operationally-redundant tests \( [x = \cdot] \) under choice is for typing purposes; they would be eliminated with a more sophisticated construct that performed matching and mismatching in conjunction with choice.

Define the relation \( P_1 \mathrel{\overset{\alpha_1}{\leadsto}_\tau} P_n \) to hold iff \( P_1 \overset{\alpha_1}{\leadsto} P_2 \overset{\alpha_2}{\leadsto} \ldots \overset{\alpha_{n-1}}{\leadsto} P_{n-1} \overset{\alpha_n}{\leadsto} P_n \). The encodings of selection and branching have the following reductions (again, we omit the reductions when \( n \) and \( \bar{n} \) are swapped):

\[
\begin{align*}
(n \triangleq l_1 . P) \triangleright (\nu \bar{n} \triangleright \{ l_1 : P_1 \parallel l_2 : P_2 \}) & \overset{\alpha_1 [l_1]}{\leadsto} \bar{n} [l_1] P \triangleright (\nu n_1) (\nu n_2) (\lambda n_1) (\lambda n_2) (\lambda \alpha) \begin{cases} x = l_1 . n_1 * \\ x = l_2 . n_2 * \\ x \neq l_1 [x \neq l_2] error * \\ ((\nu n_1 ? y . [x = l_1] P_1) + (\nu n_2 ? y . [x = l_2] P_2)) \end{cases} \\
(n \triangleq l_2 . P) \triangleright (\nu \bar{n} \triangleright \{ l_1 : P_1 \parallel l_2 : P_2 \}) & \overset{\alpha_2 [l_2]}{\leadsto} \bar{n} [l_2] P \triangleright (\nu n_1) (\nu n_2) (\lambda n_1) (\lambda n_2) (\lambda \alpha) \begin{cases} x = l_1 . n_1 * \\ x = l_2 . n_2 * \\ x \neq l_1 [x \neq l_2] error * \\ ((\nu n_1 ? y . [x = l_1] P_1) + (\nu n_2 ? y . [x = l_2] P_2)) \end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

The remaining matching and mismatching subprocesses are not garbage collected, but are stuck and so do not affect subsequent computation.

If \( l_1 = l_2 \), both of the reductions above are possible, but only one of the subprocesses \( P_1, P_2 \) will be chosen as discussed above. However, it is necessary to assume \( l_1 \neq l_2 \) to derive the usual typing rule for (our encoding of) branching.

We now return to the case when a token \( k \notin \{ l_1, l_2 \} \) is sent on \( n \). In order to observe the synchronous transmission on \textit{error} via the annotated reduction relation, we place processes in parallel with the process \( \textit{error}?z \) that receives a message on \textit{error}—such parallel composition does not enable additional reductions when either \( l_1 \) or \( l_2 \) is sent on \( n \), because transmission on \textit{error} occurs after stuck mismatching tests.

\[
\textit{error}?z \triangleright (n \triangleq k . P) \triangleright (\nu \bar{n} \triangleright \{ l_1 : P_1 \parallel l_2 : P_2 \}) \overset{\alpha_1 [l_1]}{\leadsto} \bar{n} [k] P \triangleright (\nu n_1) (\nu n_2) (\lambda \alpha) \begin{cases} x = k . n_1 * \\ x = k . n_2 * \\ \alpha [k] \bar{n} \triangleright (\nu n_1 ? y . [x = k . l_1] P_1 + \nu n_2 ? y . [x = k . l_2] P_2) \end{cases}
\]

This sequence of annotated reductions captures both the erroneous transmission of \( k \notin \{ l_1, l_2 \} \) and the subsequent use of a channel \textit{error} that is intended to have no interaction. Both transmissions are prevented in well-typed processes by conformance Theorem 7 (see Example 14).

The reader familiar with session types may wonder about the typing of \textit{error} \( * \) when \textit{error} has a session type that permits no interaction. We address this point in Section 3.
An Extensible Approach to Session Polymorphism

3. Polymorphic Session Typing

In this section we describe our polymorphic session type system for the \( \pi \) calculus. Section 3.1 provides an overview of LTS semantics for session types. Section 3.2 formalizes the semantics using logical deduction. Section 3.3 shows the treatment of binding in session polymorphism. Section 3.4 describes our approach to extensibility of session types. Section 3.5 defines type assignment for processes in terms of the LTS semantics and discusses derived rules for label selection and branching.

3.1. Session Types

Our session types control the messages transmitted on channels. Messages indicate the direction of communication and the type of communicated data. Figure 5 defines syntactic categories for types, messages, and sessions. We use session and session type interchangeably.

Types and messages are straightforward. A type may be a singleton type \( \{ k \} \), for a token \( k \), or a channel type \( Ch(S) \), for a session \( S \). The only inhabitant of the singleton type \( \{ k \} \) is the token \( k \). A channel with channel type \( Ch(S) \) must obey the protocol described by \( S \). A message may be an output \( !A \) or an input \( ?A \), for a type \( A \).

A session may be end which indicates that no communication is possible, \( M.S \) representing prefixing of session \( S \) by message \( M \), or the union \( S + T \) of sessions \( S \) and \( T \).

Additionally, \( \text{dual } S \) represents the dual of another session \( S \). The dual session \( \text{dual } S \) reverses the direction of messages within the session \( S \) — we make this precise below. In the sequel, the two endpoints \( n \) and \( \bar{n} \) of a channel are assigned channel types where one session is the dual of the other.

The type system is designed so that the grammar of sessions is extensible, indicated by the ellipsis in the definition. One example of a new session type constructor is \textit{translate} from Section 1.2. Further examples are described in this section and Section 4. This raises the question of how meaning is assigned to new session type constructors, and, more generally, for all session types.

The meaning of a session type is conventionally circumscribed by its use in type assignment rules. As discussed in Section 1, our type system decouples the meaning of a session type from its use in type assignment rules by introducing an LTS to describe the I/O operations permitted in

\[
A, B ::= \{ k \} \quad \text{(Singleton type)}
\]

\[
Ch(S) \quad \text{(Channel type)}
\]

\[
M ::= !A \quad \text{(Output message)}
\]

\[
?A \quad \text{(Input message)}
\]

\[
S, T ::= \text{end} \quad \text{(Terminal session)}
\]

\[
M.S \quad \text{(Message prefix session)}
\]

\[
S + T \quad \text{(Union session)}
\]

\[
\text{dual } S \quad \text{(Dual session)}
\]

\[
\cdots
\]

Fig. 5: Types, Messages, and Sessions
Consider the session type $\langle k_1, \langle k_3, \text{end} \rangle + \langle k_2, \langle k_4, \text{end} \rangle \rangle$.

Fig. 6: Labelled Transition System with Output Branching

the current state of a channel. This decoupling allows reasoning about transitions independently of the syntax of a session type, and consequently supports session polymorphism. Moreover, the use of an LTS semantics permits a modular description of session type constructors.

A labelled transition $S \xrightarrow{M} T$ indicates that interaction with a message $M$ on a channel in state $S$ results in a channel in state $T$. The message $M$ may be an input or an output. The labelled transitions for the sessions referenced above can be stated directly. The session end has no transitions. The prefix session has a single transition $M.S \xrightarrow{M} S$. The union session has a transition $S + T \xrightarrow{M} S'$ whenever $S \xrightarrow{M} S'$, and a transition $S + T \xrightarrow{M} T'$ whenever $T \xrightarrow{M} T'$. The dual session has a transition (dual $S$) $\xrightarrow{M}$ (dual $S'$) whenever $S \xrightarrow{M} S'$, and a transition (dual $S$) $\xrightarrow{M}$ (dual $S'$) whenever $S \xrightarrow{M} S'$. Labelled transitions can also be defined for new session types with recursive behavior. The formal LTS semantics for these and other session types is given in Section 3.2.

We next consider a series of examples to illustrate how session types and their LTSs control the behavior of processes. In these examples, we informally state that processes obey session types assigned to channels rather than discussing type assignment. Formal type assignment for processes is deferred to Section 3.5.

**Example 1** (Output branching). Consider the session type $S = (\langle k_1, \langle k_3, \text{end} \rangle \rangle + (\langle k_2, \langle k_4, \text{end} \rangle \rangle)$. The corresponding LTS for $S$ is shown in Figure 6. Suppose that a channel endpoint $n$ is assigned type $Ch(S)$. Then a process is allowed to send either $k_1$ followed by $k_3$, or $k_2$ followed by $k_4$. Thus the processes $n \langle k_1, \langle k_3, \text{end} \rangle \rangle$ and $n \langle k_2, \langle k_4, \text{end} \rangle \rangle$ obey the session type $S$.

Unlike (Honda et al., 1998), we allow the terminal process $0$ when channels are not in a terminal state. For example, the processes $n \langle k_1 \rangle$ and $0$ also obey the session type $S$. This demonstrates that the output on channel $n$ can be a prefix of the tokens output on a path from $S$ in processes that have neither deadlock nor divergence.

The order of messages in an LTS is significant. This means that $n \langle k_3 \rangle$ does not obey the session type if $k_3 \notin \{k_1, k_2\}$. Similarly, $n \langle k_2 \rangle \cdot n \langle k_3 \rangle$ does not obey the session type $S$ if $k_1 \neq k_2$ and $k_3 \neq k_4$.

Session type LTSs are intended to control the output operations on a channel rather than the input operations and subsequent matching and mismatching operations. Nevertheless, transitions labelled with input messages control the evolution of session types. **Example 2** illustrates this asymmetry between input and output.

**Example 2** (Input branching). Consider the session type $S = (\langle k_1, \langle k_3, \text{end} \rangle \rangle + (\langle k_2, \langle k_4, \text{end} \rangle \rangle).
The corresponding LTS for $S$ is shown in Figure 7. Suppose that a channel endpoint $n$ is assigned type $Ch(S)$. If input is received on $n$, then it may be either $k_1$ or $k_2$. If $k_1$ is received, then an output of $k_3$ is allowed. Similarly, $k_4$ can be output if $k_2$ was received.

There are no requirements for processes to read an input, to use a received value, or to send output after an input. For example, the processes $0$ and $n?x$ both obey the session type $S$.

Suppose $k_1 \neq k_2$ or $k_3 = k_4$. Since the output of $k_3$ is conditional upon first receiving $k_1$, in general the process $n?x. n!k_3$ does not obey the session type $S$. However, if the input is found to be $k_1$, then the output $k_3$ is enabled. In particular, the process $n?x. \{x=k_1\} n!k_3$ does obey the session type $S$.

To see why $k_1 \neq k_2$ or $k_3 = k_4$ is necessary suppose that $k_1 = k_2$ and $k_3 \neq k_4$. Then the process $n?x. [x=k_1] n!k_3$ does not obey the session type $S$, because the output process $n!k_3$ obeys the first branch’s session type $!k_3.end$, but does not obey the second branch’s session type $!k_4.end$. This highlights the universal nature of analysis for input processes: every possible labelled transition must be considered after an input occurs. In contrast, analysis for output processes is existential: some labelled transition must exist for an output to be permitted.

Finally, suppose that $k_3 = k_4$. In this case, the process $n?x. n!k_3$ also obeys the session type $S$ without performing any matching to determine whether $x = k_1$ or $x = k_2$. The match is unnecessary because the output can occur in either branch of the original session type.

Perhaps surprisingly, we do not prohibit input operations in processes. That is, an input operation is allowed at any session type, even if the session type has no input. This is for two reasons. Firstly, we believe that a framework for session polymorphism must, at least, accommodate the unidirectional forwarding process (see Section 1.1 and Example 11). It is unclear how to control the input operation in this process in a way that works for all session types. Secondly, control over output operations is sufficient because it ensures that channels only carry values permitted by a session type, yielding subject reduction, runtime safety, and conformance results (see Section 5 for further discussion).

The free use of input operations in processes is demonstrated in the next example.

**Example 3 (Terminal).** The session end has no transitions. Suppose that $n$ is assigned type $Ch(end)$. The process $n!k$ does not obey the session type end, because output is controlled and end has no output transitions.

In contrast, the process $n?x$ does obey the session type end, despite the lack of input transitions from end, because input is not controlled.

However, the continuation of an input process is checked under the assumption that an input occurs. To see the consequences, consider a separate channel error that also has type $Ch(end)$. In
this case, the process $n?x.error!k$ obeys the session types for $n$ and $error$ because no input can occur on $n$ (since it has type $Ch(\text{end})$), and so the output on $error$ cannot occur. In other words, $error!k$ is identified as unreachable code. Technically, the assumption of an input transition from end, in conjunction with the inversion principle that there are no input transitions from end, yields a contradiction that allows typing of $error!k$. This is verified by the type system in Section 3.5.

Unlike the session types of (Honda et al., 1998), our session types may have labelled transitions for both input and output from the same state. Example 4 illustrates the effect on processes.

**Example 4 (Input and output branching).** Consider $S = (?k_1.tk_3.end) + (tk_2.tk_4.end)$. The corresponding LTSs for $S$ and $(\text{dual } S)$ are shown in Figure 8. Suppose that the channels $n$ and $\pi$ are assigned types $Ch(S)$ and $Ch(\text{dual } S)$ respectively. There are two possible interactions that can occur on $n$. Either the token $k_1$ is received on $n$ or the token $k_2$ is sent on $n$. Synchronous interaction ensures that $k_2$ cannot be sent on $n$ whilst $k_1$ is sent on $\pi$. The processes $n?x.n!k_3$ and $n!k_2.n!k_4$ both obey the session type $S$. Hence, the composite process $(n?x.n!k_3) + (n!k_2.n!k_4)$ also obeys the session type $S$. □

### 3.2. Formalization

We now turn to the formalization of the labelled transition relation for session types in Coq.

The sets of types, messages, and session types seen previously are defined in a straightforward way by mutual induction in Coq (Bertot and Castéran, 2004), following the grammar of Figure 5. Variables for session types are encoded as Coq variables of type $session$. Similarly for type and message variables. We use the following naming convention when we bind types, messages, and sessions explicitly: $a$ for types, $m$ for messages, and $s$ for sessions. In the typing rules of Section 3.5, this serves to highlight the binding that occurs in the treatment of input. However, this is merely a convention, since both $s$ and $S$ denote Coq variables of type $session$. 

![Fig. 8: Labelled Transition System with Input and Output Branching](image)
Inductive transition : session ⇒ message ⇒ session ⇒ Prop :=
(* Part 1 *)
| TRPrefix : ∀ s m, (m.s m, s)
| TRUnion1 : ∀ s1 s2 t1 m, (s1 m → t1) ⇒ (s1 + s2 m → t1)
| TRUnion2 : ∀ s1 s2 t2 m, (s2 m → t2) ⇒ (s1 + s2 m → t2)
| TRDual1 : ∀ s t a, (s 1 t a) ⇒ (dual s 2 → dual t)
| TRDual2 : ∀ s t a, (s 2 t a) ⇒ (dual s 1 → dual t)
(* Part 2 *)
| TRFwd : ∀ s, (fwd s Ch s Ch (dual s) end)
| TRSink : ∀ s, (sink s Ch (dual s) sink)
| TRFun : ∀ a, (fun a Ch (dual a) fun a)
(* Part 3 *)
| TRFwdPrefix : ∀ s, k, (fwdprefix k s Ch (dual s) end)
| TRTranslate1 : ∀ s s', s 1 (COLOUR) s' ⇒ translate(s) 1 (COLOUR) translate(s')
| TRTranslate2 : ∀ s k s', k ≠ COLOUR ⇒ s 2 (COLOUR) s' ⇒ translate(s) 2 (COLOUR) translate(s')
| TRTranslate3 : ∀ s s', s 1 (COLOUR) s' ⇒ translate(s) 1 (COLOUR) translate(s')
| TRTranslate4 : ∀ s k s', k ≠ COLOR ⇒ s 1 (COLOR) s' ⇒ translate(s) 1 (COLOR) translate(s')

Fig. 9: Coq Encoding of the Labelled Transition Relation

Lemma stop_inv : ∀ m t, (end m → t) ⇒ False.

Lemma prefix_inv : ∀ m s m' s' (Φ : Prop),
  ((m = m' ∧ s = s') ⇒ Φ) ⇒ ((m.s m', s') ⇒ Φ).

Lemma union_inv : ∀ s1 s2 m t (Φ : Prop),
  ((s1 m,t) ⇒ Φ) ⇒ ((s2 m,t) ⇒ Φ) ⇒ ((s1 + s2 m,t) ⇒ Φ).

Lemma dual_inv : ∀ s m t (Φ : Prop),
  (∀ a t', (m = ?a ∧ t = dual t' ∧ (s 1 t a) ⇒ Φ) ⇒ (∀ a t', (m = 1 a ∧ t = dual t' ∧ (s 2 t a) ⇒ Φ) ⇒ (dual s m,t) ⇒ Φ).

Fig. 10: Inversion Principles for Labelled Transitions
The inductive definition of the labelled transition relation is shown in Figure 9. We use “⇒” for the Coq function space (implication) to avoid confusion with other notations. The labelled transition relation is encoded as the transition function, which maps into the space of propositions Prop.

The declared functions, such as TRPrefix, may be used to construct proofs that a labelled transition exists. For example, applying TRPrefix to the session end and the message !{k} establishes the existence of the labelled transition !(k).end −→ {⋯}.end. There are no functions declared for the terminal session end because it has no transitions.

The TRUnion₁ and TRUnion₂ function declarations describe the transitions from a session S + T in terms of transitions from S and T respectively. Similarly, the two cases for transitions from a session (dual S) reverse the direction of messages, transforming outputs to inputs and vice versa. The dual (dual (dual S)) of a dual session type is a distinct session type from S, but they have the same labelled transitions (see the discussion of subtyping and similarity in Section 6).

We defer the discussion of transitions in parts 2 and 3 of Figure 9 to Section 3.3 and Section 3.4.

The definition in Figure 9 yields an induction principle for the labelled transition relation. From this induction principle, we derive an inversion principle for each session type constructor.

The inversion principle for a session-type constructor θ permits case analysis upon labelled transitions of the form θ(⋯) −→ M.T. The Coq statements of the derived inversion principles are shown in Figure 10.

The lemma stop_inv states that the false proposition False can be derived from the existence of a labelled transition from end. The lemma prefix_inv states that a proposition Φ can be deduced from the existence of a labelled transition m.s −→ s′, if Φ can be proven when m = m′ and s = s′. Next, union_inv allows deduction of Φ from a transition s₁ + s₂ −→ t if Φ holds both when the transition comes from s₁ and when it comes from s₂. Similarly, dual_inv allows case analysis upon a transition of the form dual s −→ t by reasoning about the transitions of s after replacing input with output and vice versa.

The polymorphic component of our type system relies upon deducing output-labelled transitions from input-labelled transitions. Example 5 illustrates how deductions can be made from an input-labelled transition.

Example 5. Consider sessions s₁, t and a type B. Suppose dual s₁ −→₂B t. Using the inversion lemma dual_inv, we establish the proposition Φ defined as (∃t′, t = dual t′ ∧ s₁ −→₁B t′). The hypotheses for dual_inv require Φ to be proven when ?B = ?a and ?B = !a. In the former case, we find that B = a, and Φ follows trivially. In the latter case, Φ holds because ?B = !a cannot be unified.

Other deductions may be made from Φ. For example, we could further deduce that (∃t′, ∀s₂, t = dual t′ ∧ s₁ + s₂ −→₁B t′) using TRUnion₁ and Φ. This deduction could be used to justify the correctness of a process that reads a message of type B on a channel of type Ch(dual s₁) and then writes the same message to a channel of type Ch(s₁ + s₂).

3.3. Binding in Session Polymorphism

The session type constructors defined in part 1 of Figure 9 are not exhaustive. Additional session types are necessary to describe the relationship between the types of distinct objects. Our
Moreover, the annotations can be used to verify that the process obeyed the session types for the labelled transition relation. We now illustrate this using the transitions defined in part 2 of Figure 9. We omit the straightforward inversion principles for these session types.

The first additional session type \texttt{fwd} demonstrates the use of binding in session types to capture relationships between the types of different values. The transition \texttt{TRFwd} in Figure 9 is labelled with two input messages. This abbreviates multiple labelled transitions shown below. The intermediate session type constructor \texttt{fwd}' has a session type parameter \texttt{s} that is identical to the session type in the message of the first labelled transition. The second labelled transition constrains the session type of the second message to be the dual \ensuremath{(\texttt{dual} \; \texttt{s})} of the session type of the first message \texttt{s}.

\begin{align*}
\texttt{TRFwd} : & \forall \; s : \text{session}, \; (\texttt{fwd} \; \triangleleft Ch(s) \rightarrow \texttt{fwd}'(s)) \\
\texttt{TRFwd} : & \forall \; s : \text{session}, \; (\texttt{fwd}'(s) \rightarrow Ch(\texttt{dual} \; s) \rightarrow \text{end})
\end{align*}

The session type \texttt{fwd} is polymorphic in the sense that a channel of type \texttt{Ch(fwd)} can be used to receive two channels with dual session types. Example 6 demonstrates the use of the polymorphism of \texttt{fwd} in a generic process that safely forwards a message from one channel to another.

**Example 6 (Polymorphic single-step forwarding process).** Consider channels \texttt{\pi_1} and \texttt{n_2} that are assigned types \texttt{Ch(T)} and \texttt{Ch(dual T)} respectively, for any session \texttt{T}. If a third channel \texttt{n_3} is assigned the type \texttt{Ch((dual \; \texttt{fwd}))}, then the sequence of outputs in the process \texttt{P} defined by:

\[
P \triangleq n_3! \pi_1 . n_3! n_2
\]

follows the sequence of output-labelled transitions dual \texttt{fwd} \ensuremath{\triangleleft Ch(T)} \rightarrow Ch(\texttt{dual T}), dual \texttt{end}, where \texttt{s} has been instantiated with \texttt{T}.

If the channel endpoint \texttt{\pi_3} is assigned type \texttt{Ch(fwd)}, then it is expected that, for some unknown session type \texttt{s}, channels with dual session types \texttt{s} and \texttt{(dual s)} can be read from \texttt{\pi_3}. Now, whenever there is an input-labelled transition \texttt{s \rightarrow A \; s'}, then \texttt{TRDual2} ensures that there is a corresponding output-labelled transition dual \texttt{s \rightarrow A \; dual s'}. Then the generic single-step forwarding process \texttt{Q}, defined as follows, obeys the session type \texttt{(dual s)} for channel \texttt{y}.

\[
Q \triangleq \pi_3?x . \pi_3?y . x?z . y!z
\]

This is because any input \texttt{x?z} is associated with some input-labelled transition \texttt{s \rightarrow A \; s'}, where \texttt{z} has type \texttt{A}, and so the corresponding output-labelled transition dual \texttt{s \rightarrow A \; dual s'} justifies the output \texttt{y!z}.

The single-step forwarding process \texttt{Q} can then be used to forward from \texttt{\pi_1} to \texttt{n_2} by using process \texttt{P} to provide the channels \texttt{\pi_1} and \texttt{n_2}. In this case, the \texttt{s} session parameter in the transitions of \texttt{fwd} is instantiated with \texttt{T}. To illustrate, suppose there exists a token \texttt{k} such that \texttt{T \rightarrow A[k] \rightarrow T'}, so token \texttt{k} may be received on \texttt{\pi_1}, and \texttt{k} may be sent on \texttt{n_1}. The reduction sequence below shows the initialization of \texttt{Q} via \texttt{P}, the reception of \texttt{k} on \texttt{\pi_1} by \texttt{Q}, and the transmission of \texttt{k} on \texttt{n_2} by \texttt{Q}. Moreover, the annotations can be used to verify that the process obeyed the session types for \texttt{n_1}.
and $n_2$.

\[
\begin{align*}
Q & \vdash n_1 ! k \mid n_2 ? x \\
\frac{n_1 \uparrow}{n_3 ! n_2 \mid (\overline{n_2} ? y \cdot n_1 ? z \cdot y ! z) \mid n_1 ! k \mid \overline{n_2} ? x} \\
\frac{n_1 \uparrow}{(\overline{n_1} ? z \cdot n_2 ! z) \mid n_1 ! k \mid n_2 ? x} \\
\frac{n_1 \uparrow}{n_2 ! k \mid \overline{n_2} ? x} \\
\frac{n_2 \uparrow}{0}
\end{align*}
\]

It is natural to ask whether the single-step forwarding process $Q$ can be coerced into sending messages that are not permitted by the session type for the channel $y$. For example, suppose $T = \text{end}$. Then there are no transitions from $T$ or (dual $T$). In the reduction sequence above, the output $n_2 ! k$ is not permitted by the session type (dual end) for $n_2$. However, the blame lies with the earlier output $n_1 ! k$ that is also not permitted by the session type (dual end) for $n_1$. Thus the single-step forwarding process $Q$ may send messages not permitted by session types when other subprocesses send messages not permitted by session types. Nevertheless, in typing $Q$ we shall see that the output $y ! z$ obeys session types using the argument from Example 3. The results of Section 5 show that this suffices for well-typed processes.

Although the session types of channels may be related, they evolve independently. For example, the type of $n_2$ is unaffected by changes to the type of $n_1$. As another example, any type assigned to $Q$ in our system can also be assigned to the following $Q'$, which inverts the order of the second and third inputs.

\[
Q \doteq n_3 ? x \cdot x ? z \cdot \overline{n_2} ? y \cdot y ! z
\]

Finally, the channel variables $x$ and $y$ in $Q$ have dual session types $s'$ and (dual $s'$), for some session type $s'$, whenever $Q$ terminates. Thus $x$ and $y$ are candidates for sending on another channel of type fwd. This forms the core of a multi-step forwarding process in Example 11. $\square$

The other session types from part 2 of Figure 9 are sink and (fun $(A)$), for a type $A$. A channel with type $Ch(\text{sink})$ can be used to repeatedly read messages of type $Ch(s)$, for some session type $s$. A channel with type $Ch($fun $(A)$) can be used to repeatedly read messages of type $A$. We say that the session types sink and (fun $(A)$) — and their dual sessions (dual sink) and (dual (fun $(A)$)) — are stateless, because every transition is a self loop. Channels with stateless types can be freely copied without causing confusion about their current state.

The (fun $(A)$) session type is used for communication that plays the same role as session initiation in (Honda et al., 1998), e.g., in Example 11, a channel of type $Ch($fun $(Ch(\text{fwd})))$ is used to repeatedly receive single-use channels of type $Ch(\text{fwd})$.

The distinction between sink and fun lies in the fact that (fun $(A)$) represents a collection of session types indexed by $A$, whereas sink is a single session type. Consequently, a channel of type sink can be used to read a sequence of channels, but there need not be any relationship between the session types of those channels.

### 3.4. Extensibility

Similar polymorphic session types can be defined for communication of channels with more complex relationships between their session types. Example 7 gives a polymorphic session type for a generic “prefixing” process.
Example 7 (Polymorphic prefixing). The following process receives two channels as \( x \) and \( y \), waits for an input \( z \) on \( x \), and then sends both \( k \) and \( x \) on \( y \). It differs from the single-step forwarding process of Example 6 by including an additional output \( y \!)k \), for some fixed token \( k \).

\[
n?x.n?$y.x?z.y!k.y!z
\]

In order to define the type of the channel \( n \), we can introduce a new session type \((\text{fwdprefix } k) \) with the sequence of labelled transitions defined in part 3 of Figure 9. In this session type, the first value received is a channel with session type \( s \), and the second value received is a channel that permits an initial output of \( k \), followed by \((\text{dual } s)\).

This prompts the question, which session types must be defined? We adopt an open-world approach, and allow new session types to be introduced as needed. New session types are introduced with their labelled transitions. In order to avoid changing the meaning of other session types, a new session type constructor \( \theta \) may only add transitions of the form \( \theta((\bar{S})) \rightarrow T \) to the inductively-defined transition relation, i.e., the source of the transition must be a session type with \( \theta \) as the outermost constructor. We prohibit reasoning via induction over the inductively-defined set of session types or the inductively-defined transition relation, because such arguments must be modified when new session types are subsequently added. There is one exception: we permit induction over the transition relation for the derivation of inversion principles for each session type constructor. Unlike the induction principle for the transition relation, the inversion principles for existing session type constructors remain unchanged when new session types are defined. The result is a modular framework for the definition of session types and their transitions.

As a second example, recall the \textit{translate} process from Section 1.2 that replaces a \textit{COLOUR} token with a \textit{COLOR} token. A new session type \textit{translate}(s) is introduced to describe the effects of translation. To specify the translation, we use equational and inequational constraints in the definition of the labelled transition relation. With such constraints, session-type transducers can be constructed to add, remove, or replace tokens from a session.

Example 8 (Translation). Part 3 of Figure 9 gives labelled transitions for session types of the form \textit{translate}(s), for some session type \( s \). The behavior of \textit{translate}(s) has been extended to permit replacement of \textit{COLOUR} with \textit{COLOR} for both input and output, i.e., the session type describes bidirectional translation.

Consider channels \(\text{en}_\text{gb} \) and \(\overline{\text{m}}_\text{as} \) with types \( Ch(s) \) and \( Ch(\text{dual } (\text{translate}(s))) \), for some session type variable \( s \), with the intention that tokens read from \(\text{en}_\text{gb} \) are translated and then sent on \(\overline{\text{m}}_\text{as} \), and that tokens read from \(\overline{\text{m}}_\text{as} \) are translated and then sent on \(\text{en}_\text{gb} \). Examining the transitions of \(\text{dual } (\text{translate}(s)) \), we find that any token \( k \) read from \(\text{en}_\text{gb} \) is either \textit{COLOUR}, in which case \textit{COLOR} can be written to \(\overline{\text{m}}_\text{as} \), or \( k \neq \textit{COLOUR} \) and \( k \) can be written to \(\overline{\text{m}}_\text{as} \). Similarly, any token \( k \) read from \(\overline{\text{m}}_\text{as} \) is either \textit{COLOR}, in which case \textit{COLOUR} can be written to \(\text{en}_\text{gb} \), or \( k \neq \textit{COLOR} \) and \( k \) can be written to \(\text{en}_\text{gb} \).

To see the effect of \textit{translate}, consider session \( ?\{\text{COLOUR}\}.((!\{\text{RED}\}.\text{end}) + (!\{\text{BLUE}\}.\text{end})) \), for \(\text{en}_\text{gb} \), perhaps representing an incoming request followed by an outgoing \textit{RED} or \textit{BLUE} response. When \( s \) is instantiated with this session, the corresponding session \( \text{dual } (\text{translate}(s)) \) for \(\overline{\text{m}}_\text{as} \) is easily seen to have the same LTS as \(!\{\text{COLOR}\}.((?\{\text{RED}\}.\text{end}) + (?\{\text{BLUE}\}.\text{end})) \).

The difference in the inequations in \texttt{TRTranslate2} and \texttt{TRTranslate4} reveals a subtlety in the specification of polymorphic translations. The channels \(\text{en}_\text{gb} \) and \(\overline{\text{m}}_\text{as} \) are able to carry pre-
translated tokens, i.e., $en_{gb}$ may carry a pre-translated COLOR, which can be copied to $\overline{m}_{at}$; and a pre-translated COLOUR may be received from $\overline{m}_{at}$, then copied to $en_{gb}$. An alternative is to prevent $en_{gb}$ and $\overline{m}_{at}$ from using the other’s language, i.e., $en_{gb}$ is restricted to receiving and sending COLOUR, and similarly for $\overline{m}_{at}$ and COLOR. It is not sufficient to add the conjunction of $k \not= \text{COLOUR}$ and $k \not= \text{COLOR}$ to the hypotheses of $TR\text{Translate}_2$ and $TR\text{Translate}_4$, because it affects the session type of $\overline{m}_{at}$ but not the session type $s$ of $en_{gb}$. Instead, we can assign $en_{gb}$ the type $Ch(\text{translate}'(s))$, where $\text{translate}'$ is a new session type constructor that prevents transmission of COLOR. We omit the definition of $\text{translate}'$.

\[\square\]

3.5. Type Assignment

We now turn to type assignment for processes. Our type system shares many ideas with other session type systems: checking that outputs are permitted by the session type for the output channel, assigning dual session types to new channel endpoints created by restriction, and linear usage of process contexts containing values of channel type.

The most significant differences arise from the use of binding and constraints: an input process adds an input-labelled transition constraint to the context when typing the continuation process, a matching (resp. mismatching) process adds an equality (resp. inequality) constraint to the context when typing the continuation process, and an output process deduces that an output-labelled transition follows from the constraints in the context.

We represent binding and constraints via a context $\Delta$. A context is a finite list of $\delta$, where $\delta$ ranges over variables, (in)equations, and transitions:

$$\delta ::= a \mid m \mid s \mid A = A' \mid M = M' \mid S = S' \mid A \not= A' \mid M \not= M' \mid S \not= S' \mid S \vdash T$$

We translate judgements using contexts into Coq propositions by first encoding the judgement form as an inductive type in the standard way (Bertot and Castéran, 2004), then adding each (in)equation and transition as a hypothesis and each variable as a universal quantifier. For example, use of the context $(m, s, S \vdash s, S = s)$ with a judgement $\jmath$ is represented as:

$$\forall m : \text{message}, \forall s : \text{session}, (\langle S \vdash m \Rightarrow s \rangle \Rightarrow (S = s \Rightarrow \jmath))$$

This encoding of contexts is not closely tied to Coq, and could be supported in other logics with inductive families of data types.

We write $\Delta \vdash \delta$ to indicate that a constraint $\delta$ can be deduced in Coq from the context $\Delta$. For example, typing of output process relies upon deduction of a labelled transition $\Delta \vdash S \Rightarrow T$. We write $\Delta \vdash \bot$ to indicate that the set of constraints $\Delta$ is inconsistent, i.e., they allow the false proposition to be deduced. We allow reordering of contexts without comment when variables are not used before their binding occurrence.

In addition to the constraints in $\Delta$, the process typing judgement $\Delta; G \vdash P$ requires a process context. A process context, $G = \{u_1 : A_1, \ldots, u_n : A_n\}$, is a partial map from variables to types. If $G_1$ and $G_2$ have disjoint domains, then $G_1, G_2$ denotes their disjoint union, and $G, u : A$ denotes $G, \{u : A\}$. Suppose $G = \{u_1 : A_1, \ldots, u_n : A_n\}$. In this case, define $\text{dom}(G) \triangleq \{u_1, \ldots, u_n\}$ and $\text{ran}(G) \triangleq \{A_1, \ldots, A_n\}$. We only consider contexts where there are no tokens in $\text{dom}(G)$.

Session type systems place linearity restrictions on the usage of channels. However, values whose types do not change can be copied freely without confusion about their types (in the
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In particular, if \( \Delta \vdash A \) is provable in the logic. That is, we say that a type is stateless for \( \Delta \), written \( (\Delta \vdash A \text{ stateless}) \), if it is:

— a singleton type \( \{k\} \) for some token \( k \); or
— a channel type \( \text{Ch}(S) \) such that, for all messages \( m \) and session types \( s \), if \( \Delta \vdash S \overset{m}{\rightarrow} s \), then
  \( \Delta \vdash S = s \).

We say that a process context \( G \) is a partition of \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \), written \( (\Delta; G \vdash G_1 \oplus G_2) \), if

— \( G = G_1 \cup G_2 \);
— \( G \) is a partial map; and
— (\( \Delta \vdash A \) stateless), for every \( A \in \text{ran}(G_1 \cap G_2) \).

In particular, if \( (\Delta; G \vdash G_1 \oplus G_2) \), then values in \( \text{dom}(G_1) \cap \text{dom}(G_2) \) have stateless types.

The rules for value type assignment \( \Delta; G \vdash u : A \) and process type assignment \( \Delta; G \vdash P \) are given in Figure 11. We have elided a certain amount of bookkeeping from the following process typing rules, we also require: (1) that the free type, message, and session metavariables in \( \text{ran}(G) \) are contained in \( \Delta \); (2) that \( \text{fval}(P) \subseteq \text{dom}(G) \) in the rules for matching, mismatching, and inconsistent contexts; and (3) that \( \text{fval}(P) \subseteq \text{dom}(G) \cup \{u.x\} \) in the rule for input. (2) and (3) cannot be omitted without loss of the property that free names and variables are contained in the process context of a well-typed process.

The rules for stateless \( \text{P-OUT-STATELESS} \) and stateful output \( \text{P-OUT-STATEFUL} \) differ in whether the transmitted value \( v \) is stateless or not, and whether it may be subsequently used by the sender. Both output rules allow type \( A \) and session \( T \) expressions that need not be variables.

In contrast, the input rule \( \text{P-INPUT} \) introduces fresh type \( a \) and session type \( t \) variables for the unknown type of the communicated value and the session type of channel \( a \) after input. Both variables are added to the context. In addition, a labelled-transition constraint \( S \overset{\Delta a t}{\rightarrow} \) is added.

Different uses of such transition hypotheses are given in examples in the remainder of the paper. Input typing requires that \( P \) be typable for any input transition of \( S \) — in the extreme case, the judgment \( \emptyset; n : \text{Ch}(\text{end}) \vdash n ?x : P \) holds for any \( P \) (subject to restrictions on the free values of \( P \)) since end has no transitions. This freedom in input typing, in conjunction with deduction, is key to our polymorphic session typing.

The matching \( \text{P-MATCH} \) and mismatching \( \text{P-MISMATCH} \) rules require that \( P \) be typed under an additional (in)equation constraint.

The \( \text{P-NEW} \) rule creates the two endpoints of a channel, with dual sessions.

In the \( \text{P-PAR} \) rule, only values with stateless types may occur on both sides of parallel composition, other values may appear on at most one side. Similarly, only values with stateless types are permitted under replication by \( \text{P-REP} \).

The rules \( \text{P-NIL} \) and \( \text{P-REP} \) admit weakening of the process context. We discuss the effect of weakening in Section 6.

The rules in Figure 11 do not describe the deductions that can occur from \( \Delta \), because these deductions use Coq’s logic. For example, we do not include rules to instantiate variables in the context \( \Delta \). Instead, variable instantiation relies upon Coq’s application rule for the dependent function space (representing universal quantification). The only rule that we include explicitly, for illustrative purposes, is \( \text{P-INC} \). This rule allows any process to be typed (subject to the conditions on free values described above) when the context \( \Delta \) is inconsistent. Through the shallow...
\[
\begin{align*}
\Delta; G \vdash k : \{k\} & \quad \text{[V-TOKEN]} \\
\Delta; G, u : A \vdash u : A & \quad \text{[V-LOOKUP]} \\
\Delta; G \vdash 0 & \quad \text{[P-NIL]} \\
\Delta; G \vdash P & \quad \text{[P-INC]} \\
\Delta \vdash A \text{ stateless} & \quad \Delta; G, u : Ch(S) \vdash v : A \quad \Delta \vdash S \xrightarrow{\lambda k} T \quad \Delta; G, u : Ch(T) \vdash P \quad \text{[P-OUT-STATELESS]} \\
\Delta; G, u : Ch(S) \vdash u tv. P & \quad \Delta \vdash S \xrightarrow{\lambda k} T \quad \Delta; G, u : Ch(T) \vdash P \\
\Delta; G, a : t, S \xrightarrow{?x} t; G, u : Ch(t), x : a \vdash P & \quad \Delta; G, u : Ch(S) \vdash u?x. P \quad \text{[P-INP]} \\
\Delta; G \vdash \{k\}, v : \{\ell\} & \quad \Delta; G, k = \ell \vdash P \quad \text{[P-MATCH]} \\
\Delta; G \vdash [u = v] P & \quad \Delta; G \vdash u : \{k\}, v : \{\ell\} \quad \Delta; G, k \neq \ell \vdash P \quad \text{[P-MISMATCH]} \\
\Delta; G \vdash \nu \nu \nu n & \quad \Delta; G \vdash (\nu n) P \quad \text{[P-NEW]} \\
\Delta; G \vdash P & \quad \Delta; G \vdash Q \quad \Delta; G \vdash P Q \quad \text{[P-PLUS]} \\
\Delta; G \vdash G_1 + G_2 \quad \Delta; G_1 \vdash P \quad \Delta; G_2 \vdash Q \quad \text{[P-PAR]} \\
\Delta; G_1 \vdash P & \quad \forall u \in \text{dom}(G_1). \Delta \vdash G_1(u) \text{ stateless} \quad \Delta; G_1, G_2 \vdash * P \quad \text{[P-REP]} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 11: Value and Process Type Assignment
encoding of constraints in Coq, this rule corresponds to the Coq elimination rule for falsity. We see the use of \texttt{P-INC} to detect dead code in Example 9 below.

As an example of the use of deduction, we observe that the inversion principles from Figure 10 can be used when the proposition \( \Phi \) contains a process typing judgement. This permits case analysis upon session types when typing processes. For example, consider a process of the union type

\[
\text{Figure 12 contains a typing derivation for the left-hand subprocess (n?x. [x=tt]n!ff . 0). The labels \texttt{union_inv} and \texttt{prefix_inv} represent case analysis via inversion principles for the union and prefix session type constructors: the two branches arise from hypotheses of \texttt{union_inv}. We do not display the equational simplification that is performed when using these inversion principles. The label \texttt{TRPrefix} indicates use of the definition of labelled transitions for the prefix session type.}
\]
Finally, since the session types of composition as follows:

\[ \Delta; G, u: Ch(S_i) \vdash P \quad \Delta; G, u: Ch(\langle l_1 : S_1, l_2 : S_2 \rangle) \vdash u < l_i, P \quad \text{[P-select]} \quad (i \in \{1, 2\}) \]

\[ \Delta; G, u: Ch(\langle l_1 : S_1, l_2 : S_2 \rangle) \vdash u \triangleright \{ l_1 : P_1 \parallel l_2 : P_2 \} \quad \text{[P-branch]} \]

These derived typing rules closely resemble the label selection and branching rules in (Honda et al., 1998), modulo notational differences.

Derivation of the label selection rules is straightforward, following the type derivation of Figure 12. We can then rewrite the conclusion of Figure 13 as:

\[ \emptyset; \pi : Ch(\langle tt: \text{Sf}, ff: \text{St} \rangle) \vdash \pi < tt.0 \]

The derived typing rule for label branching uses ingredients found in the type derivation of Figure 12, but there are several subtleties that highlight the deduction used in typing processes.
First, $l_1 \neq l_2$ is required. To see why, suppose $l_1 = l_2$, so that the session type $\&\{l_1;S_1,l_2;S_2\}$ has input transitions labelled with $l_1$ to $S_1$ and $S_2$. In this situation, matching against $l_1$ or $l_2$ provides no information. As a consequence, the extra hypotheses $\Delta; G, u:Ch(S_2) \vdash P_1$ and $\Delta; G, u:Ch(S_1) \vdash P_2$ would have to be added to $P$-BRANCH.

Second, the type system’s focus on controlling output rather than input does not affect the derived rule $P$-BRANCH. However, as demonstrated in Example 9, a well-typed process need not have cases for every branch of a session type $\&\{l_1;S_1,l_2;S_2\}$. Moreover, a well-typed process may have unused additional cases, assuming a generalization from binary labeling to n-ary labeling. The reason that $P$-BRANCH closely resembles the label branching rule of (Honda et al., 1998) is that the initial input has to be known in order to determine which of the continuation session types $S_1$ or $S_2$ is used, in turn because those session types may permit output (which is controlled).

Finally, the introduction of the channel $\text{error}$ in the encoding of the label branching process requires $\text{error}$ to be in the domain of $G$. The session type associated with $\text{error}$ is not forced, but we choose $G(\text{error}) = Ch(\text{end})$. The session type end is stateless, and so can be freely duplicated across different occurrences of label branching. In addition, the session type end does not permit any output. Thus, if an incorrect token $k \notin \{l_1,l_2\}$ can be read on $u$, the output on $\text{error}$ seen in the reduction sequence in Section 2.3 is immediately seen to be erroneous. In particular, it is not necessary to know whether the session type of $u$ allows receipt of $k$ to know that an output on $\text{error}$ is erroneous. To rule out the possibility of output on $\text{error}$, recall that the encoding of $(u\triangleright \{l_1;P_1 || l_2;P_2\})$ uses the mismatching tests $(\{x\neq l_1\} \cup \{x\neq l_2\} \triangleright \text{error}!*)$. Thus the process $\text{error}!*$ is typechecked in an environment where $x$ is known not to be $l_1$ or $l_2$, but must also be one of those tokens because of the possible input transitions of $\&\{tt;S_{ff},ff;S_{tt}\}$. This contradiction allows the typing of $\text{error}!*$.

With the derived typing rule $P$-BRANCH, a full implementation of the negation process is then defined and typed as:

$$0:n:Ch(\&\{tt;S_{ff},ff;S_{tt}\}) \vdash n \triangleright \{tt:n!ff.0 || ff:n!tt.0\}$$

### 4. Examples

We present a series of examples to illustrate session polymorphism. The typechecking examples in this section have been verified in Coq and their proofs are available online (Goto et al., 2011).

#### 4.1. Recursive Procedures

We define a process with a polymorphic session type that discards data on a channel, and provide syntactic sugar for recursive procedure definitions.

**Example 10 (Polymorphic sink process).** We return to the sink example from Section 1.1. Recall that the sink process repeatedly reads input from a channel, say $u$. The simplest process with the required functionality is the replicated input ($*u?x$), but non-linear use of $u$ cannot be typed, except when $u$ has a stateless type. Thus, we define the sink process to be:

$$(\nu \text{rep})((*\text{rep}?!lt.ft?x.\text{rep}!lf ) \mid \text{rep}1u)$$

This process uses a stateless channel $\text{rep}$ to pass the (not necessarily stateless) channel $u$ lin-
early between occurrences of the replicated subprocesses. Each replicated subprocess reads one message from \( u \) and then forwards it on \( rep \) again.

To construct the type derivation we use the session type sink from Figure 9. The name \( rep \) is assigned type \( Ch(sink) \), and can thus appear under the replication operator because sink is stateless. Similarly for \( rep \) and \( Ch(dual \ sink) \).

It follows from \( P\text{-OUT-STATEFUL} \) and \( P\text{-NIL} \) that the right-hand subprocess may be typed as:

\[
\begin{align*}
  s; u : Ch(s), \overline{rep} : Ch(dual \ sink) & \vdash rep!u \\
\end{align*}
\]

The left-hand subprocess is typed as shown in Figure 14 (we omit the subderivation for the 0 process). \( \text{DEDN1} \) indicates application of inversion principles derived from the transition definitions for fun and sink respectively (and substitution). For example, the first input yields hypothesis sinks \( x \rightarrow a \), from which we deduce \( t = sink \) and \( a = Ch(s) \), for some session type \( s \). Note that session polymorphism in the sink session type is used at the output transition \( \text{DEDN2} \), to justify that \( \overline{rep} \) can be sent a channel of type \( Ch(t) \), which was originally received on \( rep \) at type \( Ch(s) \).

\( \text{WEAKEN} \) is a derived property of the type system that we discuss in Section 5. Using \( P\text{-PAR} \) and \( P\text{-REP} \), the entire process is typed as:

\[
\begin{align*}
  s; u : Ch(s), \overline{rep} : Ch(dual \ sink) & \vdash rep!u \\
\end{align*}
\]

The corresponding Coq typing statement for this sink process is:

\[
\forall s : \text{session}, (\text{CTX.add} \ (\text{Nm} \ \text{Free} \ "u"), \text{TChannel} \ s) \ \text{CTX.empty}) \vdash P \ \text{sink}
\]

The subprocess \( \overline{rep!u} \) that initiates the recursive reading of \( u \) is a simple use of the service. We can instantiate the session type parameter \( s \) with a session, e.g., the session \( S_1 \) defined by:

\[
S_1 = \{ k_1 \}, (\{ k_2 \}.end) + (1 \{ k_3 \}.end)
\]

In our Coq formalization, session type instantiation is simply instantiation of universal quantified parameters, hence we have:

\[
\begin{align*}
  s; u : Ch(S_1) & \vdash (\overline{rep})((\overline{rep}?lf.tlf!x.\overline{rep}!lf) | \overline{rep}!u) \\
\end{align*}
\]

Since \( \overline{rep} \) has a stateless type, it may be duplicated freely, and there can be multiple transmissions on \( \overline{rep} \) that do not arise from the replicated subprocess. For example, define the session \( S_2 \) by:

\[
S_2 = \{ k_4 \}.? \{ k_5 \}.end
\]

Then we can similarly establish typing of the process that consumes all of the messages that can
be read upon the channels $u_1$ and $u_2$ with distinct session types $S_1$ and $S_2$ respectively:

$$; u_1: Ch(S_1), u_2: Ch(S_2) \vdash \nu \nu \nu (\nu \nu \nu rep) ((\star rep? lft. lft? x. rep? lft) \mid rep! u_1 \mid rep! u_2)$$

Note that a single subprocess is responsible for consuming messages on $u_1$ and $u_2$, and this reuse relies upon the polymorphism in the session type (dual sink) of $\nu \nu \nu$ (see the discussion of sink in Section 3.2).

The direct use of replication is tedious when passing multiple channels with related session types, so we introduce syntactic sugar for recursive procedure definitions, following (Milner, 1991). For example, the recursive definition of a process functionally equivalent to the process of Example 10 is:

$$s; u: Ch(s) \vdash proc rep(lft) = lft? x. rep(lft) in rep(u)$$

We extend the syntax of processes with syntactic sugar for parameterized procedure invocations and declarations with multiple parameters.

$$P, Q ::= \cdots | f(u_1, \ldots, u_n) | proc f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = P in Q$$

These abbreviations can be expanded as follows.

$$f(u_1, \ldots, u_n) \triangleq (\forall c. (f! c. c! u_1 \ldots c! u_n))$$

$$proc f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = P in Q \triangleq \nu f (\nu f? c. c? x_1 \ldots c? x_n. P) \mid Q)$$

In these definitions, a fresh channel $c$ is created for each procedure call. The channel $c$ is passed to the replicated procedure body using the channel $f$. The channel $c$ is then used to send the arguments $u_1, \ldots, u_n$ to the replicated procedure body, which reads them using $c$. The channel endpoints $c$ and $\nu$ are discarded after carrying the parameters for one procedure call. The session type $fwd$, discussed in Section 3.2, is a typical session type for the channel $c$. In contrast, the channel $f$ must always be assigned a stateless session type because it appears in a replicated subprocess.

4.2. Forwarding Processes

We now consider a sequence of simple examples with polymorphic session types in which data is generically forwarded.

The first example builds on Example 6 to type a process that continually forwards messages in one direction. The unidirectional nature of the forwarding process is captured in its interface by a session type that functions as a one-way check valve.

**Example 11 (Polymorphic unidirectional forwarding process).** Recall that the transitions of sessions ($fun a$) and $fwd$ are defined in Figure 9 as follows.

$$\mid TRFun : \forall a: type, (fun a \rightarrow_\nu fun a)$$

$$\mid TRFwd : \forall s: session, (fwd \rightarrow_\nu Ch(s) ? Ch(dual s) end)$$

The process that forwards messages unidirectionally from channel $u$ to $v$ can be defined as:

$$s; u: Ch(s), v: Ch(dual s) \vdash proc fwd(lft, rht) = lft? x. rht! x. fwd(lft, rht) in fwd(u, v)$$
In typing, we assign \texttt{fwd} for (allow the unidirectional forwarder to be typed, because checkvalve \texttt{blocks any output transitions for (\texttt{dual} \texttt{s}), so all writes to \texttt{v} are illegal (unless in an inconsistent context). The other possibility \texttt{v:Ch(dual (checkvalve \texttt{s}))} uses the dual of the checkvalve session type, and so blocks all input transitions, but not output transitions. Since the unidirectional forwarder does not perform input on \texttt{v}, the process can be typed when \texttt{v:Ch(dual \texttt{s})} is replaced with \texttt{v:Ch(dual (checkvalve \texttt{s}))}. □

We briefly comment on some variations of the unidirectional forwarder. First we note that there are several ways to define sessions for any given protocol. Consider a lossy forwarder that drops every other message.

\begin{verbatim}
proc alternate(lft, rht) = lft?x. lft?y. rht!x. alternate(lft, rht) in ...
\end{verbatim}

We can assign type \texttt{alternate:Ch(fun (Ch(alternateSub)))}, using the session constructor altSub
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that elides inputs. Here \( \text{lft} \) is assigned type \( Ch(s) \) and \( \text{rht} \) is assigned type \( Ch(\text{dual} (\text{altSub} s)) \).

\[
\begin{align*}
&| \text{TRAlternateSub} : \forall s : \text{session}, (\text{alternateSub} \, \forall Ch(s) \forall Ch(\text{dual} (\text{altSub} s)), \text{end}) \\
&| \text{TRAltSub} : \forall s \ a \ t \ b \ u, (s \to_a t) \Rightarrow (t \to_b u) \Rightarrow (\text{altSub} s \to_a \text{altSub} u)
\end{align*}
\]

We can also assign type \( \text{alternate} : Ch(\text{fun} (Ch(\text{alternateAdd}))) \), using the session constructor \( \text{altAdd} \) that introduces inputs. Here \( \text{lft} \) is assigned type \( Ch((\text{altAdd} s)) \) and \( \text{rht} \) is assigned type \( Ch(\text{dual} s) \).

\[
\begin{align*}
&| \text{TRAlternateAdd} : \forall s : \text{session}, (\text{alternateAdd} \forall Ch(\text{altAdd} s) \forall Ch(\text{dual} s), \text{end}) \\
&| \text{TRAltAdd} : \forall s \ a \ b \ t, (s \to_a \text{altAdd} t) \Rightarrow (\text{altAdd} s \to_a \text{altAdd} t)
\end{align*}
\]

In general, forwarders may multiplex inputs. The following is the simplest such process.

\[\text{proc} \text{multiplex}(\text{lft}_1, \text{lft}_2, \text{rht}) = (lft_1 \times \text{lft}_2 \times \text{rht} \times \text{rht} \times \text{multiplex}(\text{lft}_1, \text{lft}_2, \text{rht}) \text{ in} \ldots)\]

We can assign type \( \text{multiplex} : Ch(\text{fun} (Ch(\text{zip}))) \), using the session constructor \( \text{plex} \). Here \( \text{lft}_1 \) is assigned type \( Ch(s) \), \( \text{lft}_2 \) is assigned type \( Ch(t) \) and \( \text{rht} \) is assigned type \( Ch(\text{dual} (\text{plex} s t)) \).

\[
\begin{align*}
&| \text{TRMultiplex} : \forall s \ t : \text{session}, (\text{zip} \forall Ch(s) \forall Ch(t) \forall Ch(\text{dual} (\text{plex} s t)), \text{end}) \\
&| \text{TRPlex} : \forall s \ a \ b \ t \ b' \ s', (s \to_a b \ s') \Rightarrow (t \to_b b' \ s') \Rightarrow (\text{plex} s t \to_a b \ s' \text{ t}')
\end{align*}
\]

The next example shows how bidirectional forwarding of messages affects session typing.

**Example 12 (Polymorphic bidirectional forwarding process).** The bidirectional forwarding process can be typed with the context used for the unidirectional forwarding process (without checkvalve).

\[
\begin{align*}
s \ u : Ch(s), v : Ch(\text{dual} s) &-
\text{proc} \text{bi}(\text{lft}, \text{rht}) = (lft \times \text{rht} \times \text{bi}(\text{lft}, \text{rht}) + (\text{rht} \times \text{lft} \times \text{bi}(\text{lft}, \text{rht})) \text{ in} \text{bi}(u, v)
\end{align*}
\]

As with the unidirectional forwarder, this uses the polymorphic session type \( Ch(\text{fun} (Ch(\text{fwd}))) \) for the channel \( bi \).

Unlike the unidirectional forwarding processes, the bidirectional forwarding process cannot be typed when \( u : Ch(\text{checkvalve} s) \), because output on \( a \) is blocked by \( (\text{checkvalve} s) \). That is:

\[
\begin{align*}
s \ u : Ch(\text{checkvalve} s), v : Ch(\text{dual} s) &\not\vdash
\text{proc} \text{bi}(\text{lft}, \text{rht}) = (lft \times \text{rht} \times \text{bi}(\text{lft}, \text{rht}) + (\text{rht} \times \text{lft} \times \text{bi}(\text{lft}, \text{rht})) \text{ in} \text{bi}(u, v)
\end{align*}
\]

However, there is an exception. When \( u : Ch(\text{checkvalve} s), v : Ch(\text{dual} (\text{checkvalve} s)) \), it is possible to deduce that there are no input transitions from the session type for \( v \), so the output subprocess \( a \times \text{bi}(u, v) \) is typed trivially. Thus, the bidirectional forwarder can be typed as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
s \ u : Ch(\text{checkvalve} s), v : Ch(\text{dual} (\text{checkvalve} s)) &-
\text{proc} \text{bi}(\text{lft}, \text{rht}) = (lft \times \text{rht} \times \text{bi}(\text{lft}, \text{rht}) + (\text{rht} \times \text{lft} \times \text{bi}(\text{lft}, \text{rht})) \text{ in} \text{bi}(u, v)
\end{align*}
\]

This typing overlaps with the original typing with \( u : Ch(s), v : Ch(\text{dual} s) \).
4.3. The Alternating Bit Protocol

We next define a polymorphic session typing for interaction via the alternating bit protocol (ABP) (Bartlett et al., 1969).

The ABP provides reliable transmission over an unreliable channel by tagging messages with an alternating bit, and resending messages until an acknowledgment with the correct tag is received. The existence of a polymorphic session typing allows the ABP to be used at different session types. Moreover, the polymorphic session typing captures the following correctness criterion for the ABP: if message 1 and message 2 are sent via the ABP in that order, then the ABP will not send message 2 out before message 1. This session typing holds despite internal loss and resending of messages — each of those actions could easily lead to session types that guarantee very little about message ordering. In other words, the ABP outputs a prefix of its input, and acts as the identity on channels carrying tokens, if the unreliable channel passes enough messages. This example demonstrates the expressiveness of our session typing system (by capturing the ABP’s invariant) and its modularity (as a type system).

Example 13 (The alternating bit protocol). The ABP is illustrated in Figure 15, and the ABP process is defined in Figure 16. Following (Roscoe, 1997), the unreliable channel is modelled by a lossy bidirectional forwarding process that discards some messages. Sender and receiver processes transmit messages from lft to rht, but can only interact with one another using channels l and r. Unreliable forwarding from l and r is provided by the lossy process. The $abp(lft, rht)$ process represents ABP transmission as the composition of sender, lossy, and receiver processes. The lossy process treats consecutive transmission of a bit and a message as an atomic transmission, so that if one component of the pair is lost, then so is the other. The sender and the receiver processes are parameterized by an alternating bit $i \in \{0, 1\}$, where 0 and 1 are tokens. We have used abbreviations for multiple output, $u!(v_1, \ldots, v_n).P \triangleq u!v_1 \ldots u!v_n . P$, multiple input, $u?(x_1, \ldots, x_n).P \triangleq u?x_1 \ldots u?x_n . P$, and token-matching input, $u?(i, \bar{x}).P \triangleq u?y. u?\bar{x}. [y=i] P$, for $y \notin \text{fv}(P)$.

The full ABP also allows duplication of messages on the unreliable channel. We omit duplication for the sake of simplicity, but the session types defined below do accommodate duplication of messages by the unreliable channel—essentially because they are already insensitive to retransmissions by the sender and receiver processes.

Unlike the previous examples, the ABP protocol may resend messages internally to compensate for discarded messages. Such non-linear usage is not safe in general for channel names; we thus restrict attention to session types that send only tokens, using the session type $\text{toks} s$, indexed by a session $s$, that is defined by:

$$| \text{TRToks} : \forall s k s', (s \xrightarrow{\text{toks } k s} s') \Rightarrow (\text{toks } s \xrightarrow{\text{toks } k} \text{toks } s')$$
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The interesting part of the ABP typing lies in the session types for the internal channels \( l \) and \( r \). The key is for the session type to: (1) record whether a message has been acknowledged or not; and (2) allow for duplicate messages until an acknowledgement occurs. The \((\text{ack}_i \, s \, k \, s')\) and \((\text{ack}_i \, s)\) session types provide unacknowledged and acknowledged states with respect to the value of the alternating bit \( i \). These session types have transitions defined by:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{TR\text{ack}}_1 & : \forall i \, s \, k \, s', \quad s \xrightarrow{\text{ack}_i \, s \, k \, s'} s' \Rightarrow \text{ack}_i \, s \, k \, s' \\
\text{TR\text{ack}}_2 & : \forall i \, s \, k \, s', \quad \text{ack}_i \, s \, k \, s' \xrightarrow{\text{ack}_i \, s} \text{ack}_i \, s \, k \, s' \\
\text{TR\text{ack}}_3 & : \forall i \, s \, k \, s', \quad \text{ack}_i \, s \xrightarrow{\text{ack}_i \, s} \text{ack}_i \, s \\
\text{TR\text{ack}}_4 & : \forall i \, s \, k \, s', \quad s \xrightarrow{\text{ack}_i \, s} s' \Rightarrow \text{ack}_i \, s \xrightarrow{\text{ack}_i \, s} \text{ack}_i \, s \, k \, s' \\
\text{TR\text{ack}}_5 & : \forall i \, s \, k \, s', \quad \text{ack}_i \, s \xrightarrow{\text{ack}_i \, s} \text{ack}_i \, s \\
\text{TR\text{ack}}_6 & : \forall i \, s \, k \, s', \quad s \xrightarrow{\text{ack}_i \, s} s' \Rightarrow \text{ack}_i \, s \xrightarrow{\text{ack}_i \, s} \text{ack}_i \, s \, k \, s'
\end{align*}
\]

The first two cases for \( \text{ack}_i \) allow for resending of duplicate messages or receiving old acknowledgements without changing the session type. However, if a new acknowledgement (with the current bit \( i \)) is received, then there is a transition to an acknowledged state. In the acknowledged state \( \text{ack}_i \), further duplicate messages can be sent, duplicate acknowledgements can be received, and new messages with the alternate bit \( 1-i \) can be sent, resulting in a transition to an unacknowledged state again.

In typing the lossy process, the session types for \( l \) and \( r \) need not be identical, but must remain consistent. In particular, \( r \) may be in an acknowledged state when \( l \) is in an unacknowledged state. We formalize this consistency in the session types for single-use channels transmitting \( l \) (the first channel received) and \( r \) (the second channel):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{TR\text{Lossy}}_1 & : \forall i \, s, \quad \text{lossy} \xrightarrow{\text{ack}_i \, s} \text{ack}_i \, s \\
\text{end}
\end{align*}
\]
not require channels to have terminal session types. Similarly, and for the same reason, the strengthening result for process typing judgements does not require linear channels to have a terminal session type.

Lemma 1 (Weakening). If \( \emptyset ; G_1 \vdash P \) and \( \emptyset ; G_1 \oplus G_2, then \emptyset ; G \vdash P. \)

Similar conditions must be defined for the single-use channels used to transmit the parameters to the sending and receiving processes. These conditions provide the necessary constraints between the state of the external \( lft, rht \) and the internal \( l, r \).
Lemma 2 (Strengthening). If $\emptyset; G_2 \vdash P$, $fval(P) \subseteq \text{dom}(G_1)$, and $G_1 \subseteq G_2$, then $\emptyset; G_1 \vdash P$. □

Lemma 3 (Structural equivalence preserves typing). If $P \equiv Q$, then, for all $G$, $\emptyset; G \vdash P$ iff $\emptyset; G \vdash Q$. □

The proofs of Lemmas 1–3 are routine, using induction over the derivations of typing and structural equivalence judgements. We state these and subsequent results, using the empty context $\emptyset$. The context does not appear explicitly in the corresponding Coq statements (Figure 17) because it represents the Coq hypotheses, in contrast to the process context that does appear explicitly in the Coq statements.

5.2. Subject Reduction

To ensure that communication on both endpoints of the same channel is well behaved, subject reduction requires that processes are typed in balanced process contexts (Gay and Hole, 2005; Yoshida and Vasconcelos, 2007), in which dual names are assigned dual session types.

Formally, we say that a process context is balanced, written $\text{bal}(G)$, whenever:

— If $G(u) = A$, then $u$ is a name or coname and $A$ is a channel type (i.e., not a singleton type).
— If $G(n) = Ch(S)$ and $G(\bar{n}) = Ch(T)$, then $S = \text{dual } T$ or $T = \text{dual } S$.

As in prior work for session types (ibid.), subject reduction states that reduction from a well-typed process $P$ to $Q$, yields a process that is well-typed in another process context. As shown in (Yoshida and Vasconcelos, 2007), subject reduction and subsequent safety results need not depend on the existence of a relationship between the first and second process contexts. However, it is useful to know that the process context is evolving in harmony with the interaction that occurs in processes, and we make use of this property in our conformance result (Theorem 7).

The relationship between the first and second process context specifies changes to session types that reflect interaction that occurred in the reduction. To formalize this relationship, define the function $\text{obst}(A)$ that maps a type to an observable value by hiding channels as follows (cf. the function $\text{obsv}(u)$, used in the reduction semantics Section 2.2, that maps a value to an observable value):

$$\text{obst}(\{k\}) \triangleq k$$
$$\text{obst}(Ch(S)) \triangleq \star$$

Next, we define a function $\text{obsm}(u, M)$ that maps a name or coname $u$, and a message $M$, to an observation on a name. If given a name, the direction of the message is retained. If given a coname, the direction of the message is reversed. The function $\text{obsm}(u, M)$ is defined by:

$$\text{obsm}(n, ?A) \triangleq n?\text{obst}(A)$$
$$\text{obsm}(n, !A) \triangleq n!\text{obst}(A)$$
$$\text{obsm}(\bar{n}, ?A) \triangleq n!\text{obst}(A)$$
$$\text{obsm}(\bar{n}, !A) \triangleq n?\text{obst}(A)$$

Finally, we define the context preservation relation $G_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha} G_2$ between process contexts before, $G_1$, and after, $G_2$, a reduction annotated with observation $\alpha$. The context preservation relation requires session types for dual names to evolve according to the labelled transitions for the initial
weakening
  : forall (G G1 G2 : ctx) (P : proc),
      (G1 |-p P) ->
      (G |-part G1 (+) G2) ->
  G |-p P

strengthening
  : forall (G1 G2 : ctx) (P : proc),
      (G2 |-p P) ->
      CTX.Subset G1 G2 ->
      free_values_in_context G1 P ->
  G1 |-p P

struct_equiv_preserves_typed
  : forall (P Q : proc) (G : ctx),
      (P == Q) ->
  G |-p P <-> G |-p Q

dynctx_preservation_preserves_balanced
  : forall (G1 G2 : ctx) (alpha : obs),
      (G1 |-wf) ->
      dynctx_preservation G1 G2 alpha ->
      balanced G1 ->
      balanced G2

subject_reduction
  : forall (G1 : ctx) (P Q : proc) (alpha : obs),
      reduction P Q alpha ->
      (G1 |-p P) ->
      balanced G1 ->
      exists G2 : ctx,
      (G2 |-p Q) \ dynctx_preservation G1 G2 alpha

runtime_safety
  : forall (G : ctx) (P : proc),
      (G |-p P) ->
      balanced G ->
      ~ error P

conformance
  : forall (G : ctx) (P Q : proc) (f : free_id) (s : session) (alphas : list obs),
      reductions P Q alphas ->
      (G |-p P) ->
      balanced G ->
      CTX.In (Nm (Free f), TChannel s) G ->
      traces f (project f alphas) s

Fig. 17: Type Soundness Results Verified in Coq
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\[
G \xrightarrow{\xi} G
\]

\[
S \xrightarrow{M} T, \quad u, v \text{ are dual names}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
G : Ch(S), v : Ch(dual S) \\
G : Ch(T), v : Ch(dual T)
\end{array}
\]

Fig. 18: Context Preservation Relation

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\frac{\xi u v}{\not\xi} P & \frac{\not\xi u x}{\not\xi} P & \frac{\not\xi [u = v] P}{\not\xi [u \neq v] P}
\end{array}
\]

Fig. 19: Error

session types. The context preservation relation is defined inductively by the rules in Figure 18. This context preservation relation is close in spirit to the relationship between initial and final contexts in the subject reduction result of (Gay and Hole, 2005) (Theorem 1, type preservation). The difference is that our definition captures all interaction, as opposed to capturing only interaction via label selection and branching.

Since the context preservation relation advances the session types of dual channels in tandem, it preserves the property that a process context is balanced.

**Lemma 4 (Balanced process contexts).** If \( \text{bal}(G_1) \) and \( G_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha} G_2 \), then \( \text{bal}(G_2) \).

Note that the corresponding Coq statement (in Figure 17) for Lemma 4 requires that the process context is well-formed, written \( G_1 \vdash \text{wf} \). However, in Section 3.5, we already restricted our attention in this paper to well-formed process contexts, and so we do not include it in Lemma 4. The other Coq statements do not explicitly state that contexts are well-formed because it is implied by process typing.

The subject reduction theorem then states that reduction from a process that is well-typed in a balanced process context leads to another well-typed process. Moreover, the two process contexts, and the observation from the reduction, are related by context preservation.

**Theorem 5 (Subject reduction).** If \( P \xrightarrow{\alpha} Q \) and \( \emptyset \vdash P \), for some context satisfying \( \text{bal}(G_1) \), then there exists a context \( G_2 \) such that \( \emptyset ; G_2 \vdash Q \) and \( G_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha} G_2 \).

5.3. Runtime Safety

In our language, shape errors arise in programs that confuse tokens and channels. Tokens may be compared, but may not be used for input or output; channels have complementary capabilities. In Figure 19, we formally define errors as a predicate on processes (notation \( \not\xi P \)). The use of session polymorphism, the subtle behavior of input, and subsequent deduction makes the absence of shape errors less than obvious. Nevertheless, the runtime safety theorem asserts that well-typed processes do not give rise to immediate shape errors.
Theorem 6 (Runtime safety). If $\emptyset; G \mid P$ for some context satisfying $\text{bal}(G)$ then $\neg (\triangledown P)$. □

The proof is a straightforward induction. For the base cases, note that balanced environments do not contain free variables.

In (Honda et al., 1998), a process of the form $(n! M . P) \parallel (n! M' . Q)$ is an error, and, more generally, the parallel composition of two processes offering communication on a common channel is an error if the composition is not a redex. To support freedom from the errors of the form in (Honda et al., 1998), it would be necessary for us to distinguish linear, stateful channels from stateless channels in processes. This is because stateless channels can be used in ways that would constitute an error for stateful channels, e.g., it is not an error for two processes in parallel to send on a common stateless channel. We leave this form of error for future work.

5.4. Conformance

We now prove that the behavior of a well-typed process conforms to the session types of its free channels. To do so, we first define the traces of a session type. We then show that any trace of a process, projected to the actions of a single name, is contained in the set of traces allowed by the name’s session type. This conformance result is similar to the conformance theorem of (Gay et al., 2010).

In the following definitions, $\varepsilon$ represents the empty trace, $\sigma$ ranges over traces, which is a finite list of observations, and $::$ denotes trace prefixing.

For a session $S$, consider the (prefix-closed) set of finite lists of messages obtained as paths of labelled transitions from $S$. The traces of a session $S$ at name $n$, written $\text{traces}_n(S)$, is a set of traces constructed from this prefix-closed set. We define it inductively as follows.

- $\varepsilon \in \text{traces}_n(S)$.
- $(\text{obsm}(n, M) :: \sigma) \in \text{traces}_n(S)$ if $\emptyset \vdash S \xrightarrow{M} T$ and $\sigma \in \text{traces}_n(T)$.

For a process $P$, consider the (prefix-closed) set of finite lists of observations obtained from sequences of reductions from $P$. The traces of a process $P$ at name $n$, written $\text{traces}_n(P)$, is the result of filtering only the observations for $n$ from each list in this set. It is defined inductively as follows.

- $\varepsilon \in \text{traces}_n(P)$.
- If $P \xrightarrow{\alpha} Q$ and $\sigma \in \text{traces}_n(Q)$ then
  - $(\alpha :: \sigma) \in \text{traces}_n(P)$ if $\alpha = n? \gamma$ or $\alpha = n! \gamma$, and
  - $\sigma \in \text{traces}_n(P)$ otherwise.

The conformance theorem states that the traces of a process for a free channel are contained in the set of traces for the session type of that channel.

Theorem 7 (Conformance). If $\emptyset; G \mid P$ and $G(n) = \text{Ch}(S)$, for some context satisfying $\text{bal}(G)$, then $\text{traces}_n(P) \subseteq \text{traces}_n(S)$. □

Conformance is a powerful tool for reasoning about the behavior of processes, especially in conjunction with session polymorphism and session-type functions. We briefly consider several applications.

Example 14 (Correctness of label branching encoding). Recall the use of the error channel in
the encoding of label selection and branching in Section 2.3 and Section 3.5. The derived typing rule for label branching included the requirement that the process context assigns type $Ch(\text{end})$ to $\text{error}$. Since $Ch(\text{end})$ is a stateless type, uses of $\text{error}$ can occur on both sides of parallel composition.

Now consider a process $P$ that uses the encoding of label branching from Section 2.3, where output occurs on $\text{error}$ when an unexpected label (simply a token) is received at a label branching process. We assume that $\text{error}$ is not bound in $P$. The coname $\text{error}$ can be assigned the stateless type $Ch(\text{dual end})$, and so can be freely copied if necessary. Thus, if $P$ is well-typed, we can always form the well-typed process $(P | \text{error}?x)$. Note that it is only possible to type the input process $\text{error}?x$ because our type system always allows input, and without the input process, the output process would be irrelevant.

In this example, applying Theorem 7 to the process $(P | \text{error}?x)$ with channel $\text{error}:Ch(\text{end})$ ensures that there is never a communication on $\text{error}$, because end only has the empty trace, i.e., $\text{traces}_{\text{error}(\text{end})} = \{\epsilon\}$. We conclude that label branching processes never receive incorrect labels.

**Example 15 (Correctness of the alternating bit protocol).** Recall the polymorphic session typing of the ABP in Example 13. We wish to deduce that the alternating bit protocol does not drop, duplicate, or reorder data that it forwards. Consider any finite sequence of tokens $\vec{k} = k_1, \ldots, k_m$. Then $\vec{k}$ determines a session type consisting of a sequence of inputs:

$$S_\vec{k} = ?\{k_1\} \ldots ?\{k_m\}.\text{end}$$

as well as a process that performs the corresponding outputs on a channel $\overleftarrow{\text{lft}}$:

$$P_\vec{k} = \overleftarrow{\text{lft}}!k_1 \ldots \overleftarrow{\text{lft}}!k_m$$

Now the ABP typing statement is parameterized by a session type. Instantiating that session type with $S_\vec{k}$ yields the typing:

$$\begin{array}{c}
;\text{lft}:Ch(\text{toks}S_\vec{k}), \overrightarrow{\text{rht}}:Ch(\text{dual (toks}S_\vec{k})) \vdash abp(\text{lft}, \overrightarrow{\text{rht}})
\end{array}$$

The process $P_\vec{k}$ can be typed using $\text{dual (toks}S_\vec{k})$ as the session type for $\overleftarrow{\text{lft}}$. We may then consider the parallel composition of the sender, the ABP, and the sink process of Section 4.1 (we omit the procedure bodies of both $abp$ and $\text{rep}$ for brevity):

$$P_\vec{k} \parallel abp(\text{lft}, \overrightarrow{\text{rht}}) \parallel \text{rep(rht)}$$

The above process is well-typed, because the sink process has a polymorphic session type that allows it to consume data from any channel.

Applying Theorem 7 to this process and the channel $\overrightarrow{\text{rht}}$ tells us that the traces of the process for $\overrightarrow{\text{rht}}$ are contained in the traces of dual (toks $S_\vec{k}$). From the labelled transitions of dual and toks it can be deduced that the traces of dual (toks $S_\vec{k}$) are output observations for sequences of tokens that are initial prefixes of $\vec{k}$. Thus the output of the ABP is a prefix of the input that it receives, as required.

The alternating bit protocol is a common test for mechanical verification, e.g., (Divito, 1981). Our proof establishes correctness via the modular route of session typing, and an application of conformance.
6. Related Work

(Dezani-Ciancaglini and de’ Liguoro, 2010) give a recent comprehensive survey of the session types literature. Also, (Vasconcelos, 2009) provides a tutorial reconstruction of session types in a linear $\pi$ calculus with linear and unrestricted types, where values of unrestricted types need not have linear usage, like our stateless types. We differ in using a deductive definition of statelessness that is relative to a context, rather than stating that a replication session type constructor, e.g., (fun $A$), must be used to create stateless types. This allows some additional flexibility, e.g., deducing that a channel type $Ch(S + T)$ is stateless if both $Ch(S)$ and $Ch(T)$ are stateless.

**Polymorphism.** Several forms of polymorphism have been investigated in connection with session types. The most closely-related form, discussed in the introduction, is bounded polymorphism for session types (Dezani-Ciancaglini et al., 2007b; Gay, 2008; Bono and Padovani, 2011). In that work, the syntax of a session type includes type abstractions with subtyping bounds (we also use type abstraction with session types, as discussed in Section 3.3). Our session types and types do not have subtyping bounds, but may have other logical constraints. We discuss subtyping below.

Our work differs from the prior work on bounded polymorphism in that we always allow reading from a channel, and we permit logical deduction in type derivations. The former ingredient can be seen as a form of implicit coercion, and the latter resembles a type system based upon logical deduction developed for Scheme (Tobin-Hochstadt and Felleisen, 2010). We expand on the treatment of input and deduction below. Additionally, within type derivations we use abstraction over session types across multiple channels in conjunction with functions over session types.

Other research on relating session types and linear type theories (Gay and Vasconcelos, 2010; Caires and Pfenning, 2010) has led to work that incorporates type abstraction as second-order quantification in linear logic, e.g., to establish strong deadlock freedom guarantees (Wadler, 2012), and relational parametricity results (Caires et al., 2013).

Dependent session types (Bonelli et al., 2005; Toninho et al., 2011) include abstraction over values. This form of abstraction is supported in our formalization in Coq.

(Denielou and Yoshida, 2011) use polymorphism in connection with session types, but the polymorphism is over roles associated with processes; this kind of role polymorphism is orthogonal to the issues of session polymorphism.

**Input and Deduction.** Existing session type systems only permit an input or label branching process to be typed when the corresponding session type allows the operation. In monomorphic session type systems without subtyping, e.g., (Honda et al., 1998), session types are known in their entirety at their point of use, and so there is no reason to allow input or label branching processes that can never occur.

In session type systems with subtyping, e.g., (Gay and Hole, 2005; Castagna et al., 2009) and work on bounded polymorphism, a channel $n$ with a label branch session type may not be identical to the dual of the session type for its other endpoint $\pi$. In this case, some of the label branches in a process may be redundant. This does not impact runtime safety because a well-typed process is forced to offer enough choices in a label branching process.

Our type system takes this idea further, by allowing inputs for any session type, and by depending on the sender to send correct data. It is this relaxation of input typing that permits typing
of the forwarder examples. In some cases, the code $P$ after an input $n?x.P$ can be identified as redundant because the input cannot occur, e.g., when $n$ is assigned one of the types: $Ch$(end), $Ch$(!$\{k\}$.end), or $Ch$(dual (checkvalve $S$)), for a session type $S$. However, for many generic processes with polymorphic session types, such as the forwarder examples, it is not possible to say whether an input can occur without knowing the session to which the session type variable is instantiated. (Neubauer and Thiemann, 2004b) investigates the elimination of redundant code in programs with session types, also using singleton types to promote values to types.

**Matching.** Label branching is normally an atomic operation, e.g., (Honda et al., 1998). Our encoding of label branching via interaction and matching/mismatching is not an atomic operation. One might wonder why our subject reduction theorem (Theorem 5) does not have a different structure to subject reduction theorems for calculi with atomic label branching that also relate process contexts according to labels from the reduction, e.g., (Gay and Hole, 2005; Gay, 2008). The difference lies in the process syntax and the reduction relation. In particular, our annotations occur at interaction, and our interaction does not perform the matching tests that are implicit in label branching. In contrast, the annotations of (ibid.) occur when paired label selection and branching synchronize. In other words, our annotations do not describe any matching that occurs after interaction. But they do capture any output that occurs as a result of the matching.

**Deadlock Freedom and Progress.** Other session type systems, starting from (Honda et al., 1998), require that channels with linear usage have the terminal session type end when typing the terminal process 0. Consequently, weakening is restricted to channels with terminal session type also. This design decision prevents processes from prematurely terminating a conversation. However, it does not follow that conversations are completed due to the possibility of deadlock. Partly for this reason, the constraint upon premature termination is not exploited in most prior work on session types, where the focus is upon subject reduction and runtime safety. (Kobayashi, 1998; Kobayashi, 2006) provides a type system for the $\pi$ calculus that ensures deadlock freedom by describing the dependencies between the order of use of different channels. (Dezani-Ciancaglini et al., 2006; Coppo et al., 2007) describes a stack discipline for the use of sessions that ensures deadlock freedom and progress. (Honda et al., 2008) provides a progress property also in the absence of interleaved sessions, but does so in a calculus with multiparty sessions. (Dezani-Ciancaglini et al., 2007a) instead relaxes the requirement for a stack discipline to achieve progress.

In contrast, our work seeks to extend the traditional subject reduction and safety results to session polymorphism and compositional, logical specifications of session types. We permit processes to leave a conversation incomplete, by failing to reach the terminal session end. This does not impact subject reduction, runtime safety, or conformance, but does allow some (arguably) useful generic processes with polymorphic session types, such as the sink process of Example 10. Nevertheless, whether or not conversations may be ended prematurely appears to be orthogonal to our approach to session polymorphism. The changes to the type system would involve the typing of the terminal process end, the matching and mismatching constructs (since they are terminal if they fail, using an if-then-else equality-testing construct would suffice), and the replication construct. The sink example would no longer type. On the other hand, the forwarder processes would type because they do not terminate the conversations in the $lft$ and $rht$ parameters. The single-use channels of type $Ch(fwd)$ are discarded only when they reach type $Ch$(end),
as expected. The ABP process would also type because it expects to receive tokens and not channels in its input, and so the lossy process can freely discard the tokens that it receives.

Towards Subtyping. The theory of subtyping for session types was developed in (Gay and Hole, 2005). For example, using the syntax defined in this paper, the session type \( T_1 \equiv ?\{k_1\}.S_1 \) is a subtype of \( T_2 \equiv (?\{k_1\}.S_1) + (?\{k_2\}.S_2) \), because the former has fewer inputs. Our type system does not yet incorporate subtyping. However, it is possible to use bidirectional forwarding to gain some of the expressive power of subtyping. Consider a channel \( n_1 \) with type \( Ch(T_1) \).

Without subtyping, it is not possible to send \( n_1 \) on a channel that expects a value of type \( Ch(T_2) \). Instead, create new channel endpoints \( n_2, \pi_2 \) with types \( Ch(T_2) \) and \( Ch(\text{dual } T_2) \) respectively. The channel \( n_2 \) can be sent in place of \( n_1 \), because its type is identical to the required type. Next, a bidirectional forwarding process can be used to forward messages from \( n_1 \) to \( \pi_2 \), and vice versa. The polymorphic session type given in Example 12 for the bidirectional forwarder does not allow \( n_1 \) and \( \pi_2 \) to be used because their session types \( T_1 \) and \( \text{dual } T_2 \) are not dual.

However, a more generous polymorphic session type, based upon subtyping, can be established for the bidirectional forwarder. We say that a binary relation \( \mathcal{R} \) on session types is a simulation if, for every \((S_1, T_1)) \in \mathcal{R}:

- if \( S_1 \xrightarrow{\text{lft}} S_2 \), then there exists \( T_2 \), such that \( T_1 \xrightarrow{\text{dual}} T_2 \) and \((S_2, T_2)) \in \mathcal{R} \); and
- if \( T_1 \xrightarrow{\text{rht}} T_2 \), then there exists \( S_2 \), such that \( S_1 \xrightarrow{\text{dual}} S_2 \) and \((S_2, T_2)) \in \mathcal{R} \).

Similarity is then defined to be the greatest simulation.

Similarity provides the exact information needed to typecheck the bidirectional forwarding process. Suppose the bidirectional forwarder is passed channels \( \text{lft} \) and \( \text{rht} \) with session types \( S \) and \( \text{dual } T \), where \( S \) and \( T \) are related by similarity. Then the first component of simulation guarantees that an input on \( \text{lft} \) justifies output on \( \text{rht} \), because \( \text{rht} \) has session type \( \text{dual } T \), and so reverses the direction of interaction. The second component of simulation guarantees that an input on \( \text{rht} \) justifies output on \( \text{lft} \).

If session types are related by a finite simulation \( \mathcal{R} = \{ (S_i, T_i) \mid 1 \leq i \leq n \} \), then the single-use channel that carries the arguments to the bidirectional forwarding process has session type \( \text{fwdsim}_{\mathcal{R}} \) defined by:

\[
\text{fwdsim}_{\mathcal{R}} \equiv \begin{cases} \text{Ch}(S_1).\text{Ch}(\text{dual } T_1).\text{end} \\
+ \text{Ch}(S_2).\text{Ch}(\text{dual } T_2).\text{end} \\
+ \cdots \\
+ \text{Ch}(S_n).\text{Ch}(\text{dual } T_n).\text{end} \end{cases}
\]

Finally, the bidirectional forwarder can be typed using \( \text{fwdsim}_{\mathcal{R}} \) for carrying related \( \text{lft} \) and \( \text{rht} \) channels, for all finite simulations \( \mathcal{R} \). The restriction to finite simulations arises from our strategy for encoding relations. We are investigating alternative encodings for infinite simulations.

We note that the polymorphic session typing for the bidirectional forwarder in Example 12 does effectively yield the (infinite) identity simulation. Moreover, it may be useful to add the identity relation to the simulations under consideration by typing the bidirectional forwarder with session type \( \text{fwdsim}_{\mathcal{R}} + \text{fwd} \). In this way, our original example, where \( T_1 \equiv ?\{k_1\}.S_1 \) and \( T_2 \equiv (?\{k_1\}.S_1) + (?\{k_2\}.S_2) \), need only use the relation \( \mathcal{R} = \{ (T_1, T_2) \} \). This is not a simulation, but the union of \( \mathcal{R} \) with the identity relation is a simulation.

For ground data (tokens) our definition of similarity corresponds to the behavior of subtyping at label selection and branch session types in (Gay and Hole, 2005). However, the definition of
similarity is invariant in the message types \(a\), and so, for non-ground data (channels), it is weaker than subtyping in (Gay and Hole, 2005). We leave a more complete definition of subtyping for future work.

**Polarities.** Recent work (Dezani-Ciancaglini et al., 2006; Yoshida and Vasconcelos, 2007; Giunti et al., 2009; Vasconcelos et al., 2010) has shown that polarities are unnecessary for type safety in a session type system for programmers, but that polarities can be useful within proofs about models with unpolarized channels. Nevertheless, we have adopted the polarity solution of (Gay and Hole, 2005) in an attempt to provide a more direct proof of subject reduction, and, hence, to make mechanical verification tractable.

**Formalization and Mechanical Verification.** Prior formalizations of the \(\pi\) calculus with theorem provers include the theory of strong late bisimilarity using a Higher-Order Abstract Syntax (HOAS) representation in Coq (Honsell et al., 2001), subject reduction for a type system of directionality of names using HOAS in Coq (Despeyroux, 2000), safety of a linear type system using de Bruijn indices in Isabelle/HOL (Gay, 2001), and specification and verification for processes of a \(\pi\) calculus extension using a HOAS representation in Coq (Affeldt and Kobayashi, 2008). (Malecha et al., 2011) describes a Coq library for verification of I/O behavior of programs. Their I/O specifications are based on traces rather than session types (representing sets of traces).

7. Conclusion

We have shown that:

— Session type polymorphism can be applied to simple generic processes via a novel treatment of input typing in conjunction with deduction.

— Ideas from dependent type theory for certified functions on lists can be adapted to channels with bidirectional interaction

— Session-type functions that are transducers are expressive and amenable to straightforward session typing.

These ideas appear to be robust in the sense that they may be adaptable to session typing for functional / object-oriented programming languages and may be implemented in different logical frameworks. We have developed one such implementation for the \(\pi\) calculus in Coq and mechanically verified subject reduction and safety results. This implementation has been used to validate polymorphic session typing, yielding partial correctness for the alternating bit protocol, and demonstrating that the type discipline can be applied to create modular specifications of nontrivial protocols.

The rich logic of specifications has potential application to protocols where the primary concern lies with the complexity of the language, e.g., encoding XML schema as session types. We are exploring the application of session types to a modular analysis of generic HTTP-processing code.

We have not studied conditions under which process typing is decidable, or fully general theories of subtyping / type equivalence. These issues will be explored in future work.

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References


